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COMMENTS 
THE ETHICS INVOLVED IN REPRESENTING 
MULTIPLE PARTIES IN A BUSINESS TRANSACTION: 
HOW TO AVOID BEING CAUGHT BETWEEN SCYLLA 
AND CHARYBDIS I WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE 
MARYLAND DISCIPLINARY RULES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ACT I. Scene 1. [Multiple Representation oj Joint Ventures/ 
Formation oj Business Entities]. Enter three potential clients into 
Attorney Jane's office. Attorney Jane leads the individuals into her 
office and asks how she can assist them. 
Emily Entrepreneur: Arnold, Betty, and I are entrepreneurs 
who are interested in setting up a joint venture to sell 
industrial equipment. Essentially, we have worked out the 
details and will only require your "legal drafting" assistance 
in creating a partnership. Will you represent us? [Fade Out]. 
ACT I. Scene 2. [Multiple Representation oj Existing Clients]. 
Attorney John is seated at his desk when the telephone rings. It is 
one of his existing clients, Peter Purchaser. The conversation proceeds 
as follows: 
Peter Purchaser: I have decided to purchase a seafood 
restaurant in the downtown area. I want you to draft the 
sales contract. I am purchasing the business from Sheila 
Seller, who tells me that you are also her attorney. We both 
want you to draft the sales agreement. Neither one of us 
wants any other attorney involved. Besides, you are the only 
attorney either one of us trusts. Will you represent both of 
us? [Fade Out]. 
ACT I. Scene 3. [Multiple Representation in Real Estate Trans-
actions]. Attorney Kate enters Lender Bank's conference room. Seated 
at the conference table are Bob Borrower, Sam Seller, and Leon 
1. Scylla refers to "a nymph changed into a monster in Greek mythology who 
terrorizes mariners in the strait of Messina." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLE-
GIATE DICTIONARY 1057 (1984). Charybdis refers to "a whirlpool off the coast 
of Sicily personified in Greek myth as a female monster." [d. at 228. The 
phrase caught "between Scylla and Charybdis" means having to choose "be-
tween two equally hazardous alternatives." [d. at 1057. 
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Loan Officer. Attorney Kate is not presently retained by any of the 
parties. However, Attorney Kate has represented Lender Bank in the 
past. 
Leon Loan Officer: We have called this meeting because all 
three of us are interested in hiring you as the attorney for 
this real estate transaction. Bob Borrower, our customer, 
wants to purchase a tract of residential land from Sam 
Seller. Lender Bank, of course, will be responsible for the 
financing. Your role will be to draft the sales contract and 
conduct any necessary title work. Lender Bank already has 
the mortgage agreement drafted. In the interest of saving 
money, we have decided to each contribute one-third of 
your fee. Will you ~ndertake the representation? [Fade Out]. 
Although each of the preceding hypotheticals is fictitious, similar 
dilemmas face attorneys daily. Often, an attorney's knee-jerk reaction 
is to avoid a situation involving mUltiple representation. Attorneys 
have been indoctrinated since law school with the notion that "the 
world is divided into clients and non-clients, and that there is no 
place for anything other than uncompromising advocacy in favor of 
the one, and aggressive opposition as to the other."2 Additionally, 
common sense dictates that the Rule of Matthew be followed: "No 
man can serve two masters .... "3 
Adopting a rigid Rule of Matthew approach in a multiple 
representation situation leads an attorney to overlook several legiti-
mate reasons for undertaking multiple representation. In the case of 
the entrepreneurs seeking to form a business entity, multiple repre-
sentation would be advantageous because the parties are "united in 
purpose," and hiring three separate attorneys might create conflicts 
that did not already exist. 4 When an attorney is confronted by existing 
clients seeking mUltiple representation, the involvement· of additional 
attorneys not only may make a simple business transaction "unduly 
complicate[d]," but also can "provoke unnecessary and expensive 
disputes."5 Furthermore, requiring clients to hire separate attorneys 
"pad[s] the pockets" of the profession.6 Particularly, in the real 
estate setting, using one attorney will cost less money, 7 a benefit to 
both buyers and sellers who have already incurred costs. A final 
2. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
§ 2.2: 102 (2d ed. Supp. 1993). 
3. Kenneth Kipnis, Conflict of Interest and Conflict of Obligation (1986), reprinted 
in ETIDCS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 283, 285 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. 
Elliston eds., 1986). 
4. Barry S. Martin, Counsel for the Situation, CAL. LAW., May 1987, at 18, 18. 
5.Id. 
6. See Louis M. Brown, One Lawyer for Two, BEVERLY HILLS B.A.J., Winter 
1986-87, at 50, 50. 
7. See id. at 51. 
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consideration common to all three scenarios is the overriding public 
interest in permitting an individual the right to retain counsel of his 
or her own choice. 8 
Although each of the preceding arguments contains an element 
of truth, the hard reality is that if an attorney declines to represent 
multiple parties, he could lose the future business of anyone of 
these clients. Declining to represent multiple parties becomes partic-
ularly acute when both parties are existing clients; an attorney in this 
situation risks losing existing and future business. Yet if the attorney 
blindly undertakes the multiple representation, he may create a 
situation likely to run afoul of the requirements mandated by the 
disciplinary rules. 9 
This Comment demonstrates how a Maryland practitioner who 
chooses to undertake multiple representation in a business transaction 
can do so within the ethical norms of the disciplinary rules. However, 
the disciplinary rules address only one facet of the ethical obligations 
of an attorney. Therefore, inherent in any discussion of the require-
8. Nathan B. Feinstein, Lawyers' Conflicts Under the Model Rules: A Primer, in 
CONFLICTS/ADVERTISING/HANDLING OF CLIENT'S MONEY 84, 88 (The Maryland 
Institute for Continuing Professional Education for Lawyers, Inc. ed., 1990); 
Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 
HARv. L. REV. 1244, 1303-04 (1981) [hereinafter Conflicts of Interest]. 
9. As used in this Comment, the term "disciplinary rules" generally refers to 
each state's statutory enactment governing an attorney's conduct in the practice 
of law. More specifically, "disciplinary rules" refers to each state's codification 
of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules) or the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model 
Code). Although the Model Rules are the ABA's most recent enactment, see 
infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text, not all states have enacted these 
rules. See generally 1 to 4 NAT'L REP. ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROF. REsp. (U. 
Publications of Am. 1994) (cataloguing all 50 states' disciplinary rules). 
Although lawyers must conduct themselves in accordance with the disciplinary 
rules, "[t]he [r]ules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical consider-
ations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be 
completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for 
the ethical practice of law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope 
(1983) (emphasis added). Although a violation of a disciplinary rule may 
subject an attorney to sanctioning by a disciplinary authority, it does not, nor 
should it, serve as a basis for civil liability or serve to create any presumption 
that a legal duty has been breached. Id. "Accordingly, nothing in the [r]ules 
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the 
extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty." Id. 
The disciplinary rules are typically applied in judicial decisions within the 
context of a disqualification proceeding or a fee dispute. Feinstein, supra note 
8, at 86. In either case, the court may force the attorney to remit previously 
collected attorney's fees if the attorney has violated one or more of the 
disciplinary rules. Martin, supra note 4, at 70. 
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ments of multiple representation is a complementary discussion of 
the legal obligations of attorneys.1O Because multiple representation 
in business transactions involves the application of various bodies of 
law, and depends, in large measure, on individual factual patterns, 
this Comment focuses upon the situations outlined previously in Act 
I, Scenes 1 through 3. In addition, this Comment explores the pitfalls 
inherent in multiple representation, in an effort to develop a frame-
work for the Maryland practitioner. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Traditionally, the legal community has frowned upon mUltiple 
representation. II The Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
10. Multiple representation appears to present an ethical dilemma because of an 
attorney's fiduciary relationship to each client, and the duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality that accompany such a relationship. See, e.g., Homa v. Friendly 
Mobile Manor, Inc., 93 Md. App. 337, 346-47, 612 A.2d 322, 326-27 (1992), 
cert. granted, 329 Md. 168, 617 A.2d 1085 (1993); see also HENRY S. DRINKER, 
LEGAL ETmcs 89-96 (1953) (discussing the lawyer's obligations as a fiduciary). 
" 'There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and 
confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally speaking, one more 
honorably and faithfully discharged ... .' " Id. at 89 (quoting Stockton v. 
Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850». 
11. See GLEASON L. ARCHER, ETmCAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER 64 (1910); 1 
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:103; RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETmcs 
272-73 (2d ed. 1970); Brown, supra note 6, at 50; John P. Frank, The Legal 
Ethics oj Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv. 683, 708-09 (1964); Conflicts 
oj Interest, supra note 8, at 1292. The traditional view that an attorney should 
avoid representing multiple parties is best summarized by Wise: "'No man 
can serve two masters.' If there is the slightest doubt as to whether or not the 
acceptance of professional employment will involve a conflict of interest 
between two clients ... the employment should be refused." WISE, supra, at 
273. 
The Maryland appellate courts have also championed the view that "no man 
can serve two masters." In Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 
280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974), the court of special appeals warned that multiple 
representation "should generally be avoided" in business transactions. Id. at 
300, 327 A.2d at 904. More recently, the court of special appeals reiterated its 
position in Blum v. Blum, 59 Md. App. 584, 477 A.2d 289 (1984) (holding 
that where one attorney represents both the husband and wife in a domestic 
dispute, the separation agreement will not be set aside unless the terms are 
unfair and inequitable): 
This is not the first time the Court has seen parties apparently relying 
on the same attorney. This situation has arisen frequently enough to 
suggest to the members of the Bar that no matter how careful they 
may be to explain their relationship to each of the parties, they are 
advancing at their own peril. Where there is a potential conflict in 
interest between the parties, as is true in every domestic dispute, it is 
inappropriate to attempt to represent them both. This is true even 
where the parties appear to be in full accord at the time. 
Id. at 598, 477 A.2d at 296. 
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(Model Code), as the predecessor to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (Model Rules), addresses the issue of multiple representation 
in only two subsections of Disciplinary Rule 5-105.12 Disciplinary 
Rule 5-105(B) states that "[a] lawyer shall not continue multiple 
employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment 
in [sic] behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected 
by his representation of another client.' '13 Therefore, Disciplinary 
Rule 5-105(B) prohibits an attorney from representing multiple parties 
when an actual conflict develops between those parties. However, 
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B)'s prohibition against the representation of 
multiple parties is not without limits. Even where a conflict exists 
between the parties, an attorney may continue the representation if 
he follows the mandates of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C). In the face 
of an actual conflict, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) requires an attorney 
representing multiple parties to (1) assess the situation and determine 
ifhe "can adequately represent the interest of each"; (2) fully disclose 
"the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his 
independent professional judgment on behalf of each"; and (3) obtain 
each client's consent to the multiple representation.J4 
Although Disciplinary Rule 5-105 generally permits multiple rep-
resentation, a review of Ethical Considerations 5-14 through 5-17 
demonstrates the Model Code's underlying philosophy that multiple 
representation should be avoided. IS For example, Ethical Considera-
tion 5-14 discusses the importance of an attorney maintaining his 
independent professional judgment, and concludes that an attorney's 
judgment becomes compromised "whenever [he] is asked to represent 
two or more clients who may have differing interests, whether such 
interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discor-
dant."16 Similarly, Ethical Consideration 5-15 urges attorneys to 
decline to undertake multiple representation: 
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue repre-
sentation of multiple clients having potentially differing 
interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his 
judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he 
accepts or continues the employment. He should resolve all 
12. As stated in the preamble to the Model Code, the Disciplinary Rules are 
mandatory in character and state the "minimum level of conduct below which 
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." MODEL CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmnlTY Preamble (1980). In contrast, the Canons are 
statements of axiomatic norms, and the Ethical Considerations are "aspira-
tional," representing objectives for which attorneys should strive. [d. 
13: [d. DR 5-105(B). 
14. 1d. DR 5-105(C). 
15. See id. EC 5-14 to 5-17. 
16. [d. EC 5-14. 
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doubts against the propriety of the representation. A lawyer 
should never represent in litigation multiple clients with 
differing interests .... 17 
A review of these Ethical Considerations supports the view that the 
Model Code provisions were drafted with the assumption "that the 
litigation rules of conduct apply to any lawyering process in which 
two or more parties may have separate points of view." 18 
Despite the Model Code's warnings about the dangers of multiple 
representation, attorneys, nevertheless, engaged in mUltiple represen-
tation. Once the rulemakers acknowledged the reality that attorneys 
were representing multiple parties and serving in roles much more 
expansive than that of an advocate,19 they made changes to the 
existing model. In August 1983, the House of Delegates of the 
American Bar Association (ABA) approved the Model Rules,20 re-
placing the Model Code. Maryland adopted the Model Rules on 
January 1, 1987.21 In contrast to the Model Code, the Model Rules 
recognize that an attorney can, and often does, serve in the dual 
roles of advisor and intermediary.22 
Specifically, Rule 1.723 serves as the analogue to former Disci-
17. [d. EC 5-15. 
18. Brown, supra note 6, at 50. 
19. The preamble to the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) states: 
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. 
As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding 
of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical 
implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's 
position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a 
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with 
requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between 
clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an 
advisor and, to a limited extent, acts as a spokesperson for each 
client. A lawyer acts as an evaluator by examining a client's legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. 
20. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: 
THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2 (ABA ed. 1987). 
According to Stephen GiIIers, the Model Code was in effect for 13 112 years. 
Stephen GiIIers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A 
Critical View oj the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 243 (1985). 
21. MD. RULES 1230 (1994). Once Maryland adopted the Model Rules, these Rules 
were referred to as the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. See id. 
Appendix. Because Rules 1.7 and 2.2 of the Maryland Rules of Professional 
Conduct substantively mirror Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2, this Comment only 
discusses and refers to Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2. Compare MARYLAND RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7 & 2.2 (1994) with MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7 & 2.2 (1983). 
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 2.1 & 2.2 (1983). 
23. The text of Rule 1.7 reads as follows: 
Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule 
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plinary Rules 5-101 and 5-105.24 "Rule 1.7 clarifies [Disciplinary 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of 
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not 
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of 
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities 
to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation 
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consul-
tation shall include explanation of the implications of the com-
mon representation and the advantages and risks involved. 
[d. Rule I. 7. 
24. [d. Rule 1.7 Model Code Comparison. 
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer 
May Impair His Independent Professional Judgment. 
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, 
a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his 
professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or rea-
sonably may be affected by his own financial, business, prop-
erty, or personal interests. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSffiILITY DR 5-IOI(A) (1980). 
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests 
of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment 
of the Lawyer. 
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise 
of his independent professional judgment in [sic] behalf of a 
client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the 
acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be 
likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except 
to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). 
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the 
exercise of his independent professional judgment in [sic] be-
half of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by 
his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to 
involve him in representing differing interests, except to the 
extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). 
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer 
may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can 
adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents 
to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect 
of such representation on the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment on behalf of each. 
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to 
withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no 
partner, or associate, affiliated with him or his firm may 
accept or continue such employment. 
[d. DR 5-105 (1980). 
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Rule] 5-105(A) by requiring that, when the lawyer's other interests 
are involved, not only must the client consent after consultation," 
but in addition to consent, the lawyer must be reasonably convinced 
that the representation will "not be adversely affected by the lawyer's 
other interests. "25 In contrast, Rule 2.226 has no "direct counterpart" 
in the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code,27 although it has been 
compared to Disciplinary Rules 5-105(B) and 5-105(C).211 Additionally, 
reference to the concept of an intermediary can be found in Model 
Code EC 5-20.29 
The ABA's adoption of Rule 1.7 and Rule 2.2 supports the 
position that multiple representation can be ethical, when undertaken 
25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 Model Code Comparison 
(1983). 
26. The text of Rule 2.2 reads as follows: 
Rule 2.2 Intermediary 
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if: 
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implica-
tions of the common representation, including the advantages 
and risks involved, and the effect of the attorney-client privileges, 
and obtains each client's consent to the common representation; 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved 
on terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each 
client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the 
matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the 
interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is 
unsuccessful; and 
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation 
can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on 
other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients. 
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each 
client concerrung the decisions to be made and the considerations 
relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately 
informed decisions. 
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so 
requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no 
longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to 
represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of 
the intermediation. 
Id. Rule 2.2. 
27. Id. Rule 2.2 Model Code Comparison. 
28. See id. For the text of DR 5-105(B)-(C), see supra note 24. 
29. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 Model Code Comparison 
(1983). EC 5-20 states that "[a] lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial 
arbitrator or mediator in matters which involve present or former clients. He 
may serve in either capacity if he first discloses such present or former 
relationships." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-20 (1980). 
However, as the Comment to Rule '2.2 makes clear, Rule 2.2 was not intended 
to govern attorneys who act as impartial mediators or as arbitrators between 
parties who are not clients. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 
cmt. (1983); see 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:101. 
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within certain limits. Not only do these rules provide a more concrete 
set of guidelines, but they focus on protecting clients, in apparent 
recognition that the "principal danger of [multiple] representation is 
that one of the parties will take unfair advantage of the other, 
knowingly or not. "30 
III. MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION IN MARYLAND 
A. The Relationship Between Model Rule 1.7 and Model Rule 2.2 
Before choosing to represent multiple parties in a business trans-
action, a Maryland attorney must first consider the requirements 
imposed by Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2. While Rule 1.7 addresses 
conflicts of interest generally, 31 and Rule 2.2 governs the limited 
situation where an attorney acts as an intermediary between clients,32 
neither rule explicitly outlines the situations where it should be 
applied. As a result, determining each rule's limitations and appli-
cability is difficult, particularly because both share several common 
elements.33 Therefore, by explaining each rule's requirements, this 
Comment attempts to provide guidance to the practitioner, faced 
with a multiple representation situation, as to which rule should be 
applied. 
Rule 1.7 applies in two types of conflict of interest situations: 
(1) Where representation of one client "will be directly adverse" to 
another client,34 and (2) where representation of a client "may be 
materially limited" by an attorney's obligations to another client, "a 
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests."3s Although Rule 1.7 
generally forbids representation where either type of conflict of 
interest is present,36 an attorney may undertake the representation if 
two conditions are satisfied. First, the attorney must "reasonably 
30. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 39 (1982). 
Contra Gillers, supra note 20, at 245 ("[The rulemakersJ have given us an 
astonishingly parochial, self-aggrandizing document, which favors lawyers over 
clients, other persons, and the administration of justice in almost every line, 
paragraph, and provision that permits significant choice. "). 
31. See supra note 23. 
32. See supra note 26. 
33. Both Rules 1.7 and 2.2 require that before multiple representation is undertaken, 
an attorney must (i) determine that the representation will not adversely affect 
either party; (2) fully explain the risks and advantages involved in the common 
representation; and (3) obtain client consent. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rules 1.7 & 2.2 (1983). 
34. [d. Rule 1.7(a). 
35. [d. Rule 1.7(b). The comment to Rule 1.7 indicates that paragraph (b) applies 
to multiple representation. [d. Rule 1.7 cmt. 
36. [d. Rule 1.7(a) & (b). 
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believe[] the representation [itself] will not be adversely affected. "37 
Second, the attorney must obtain each client's consent. 38 Before 
obtaining a client's consent, the attorney must disclose the "impli-
cations of the common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved.' '39 
The comment to Rule 1.7 illuminates the type of situations 
covered by this Rule. Rule 1.7 is particularly applicable in the context 
of estate planning and administration, and "where the clients are 
generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of 
interest among them."4O Rule 1.7 may also come into play when an 
attorney is representing multiple buyers or multiple sellers. Because 
Rule 1.7 imposes less strict consultation, evaluation, and withdrawal 
requirements upon an attorney than its complement, Rule 2.2,41 Rule 
1.7 is best followed when a potential conflict exists among the 
multiple clients. 42 
In a similar fashion, Rule 2.2 requires an attorney, before 
undertaking intermediation, to first "consult[] with each client con-
cerning the implications of the common representation, including the 
advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client 
privileges, and obtain[] each client's consent. "43 Second, the attorney 
must "reasonably believe[] that the matter can be resolved on terms 
compatible with the clients' best interests," that each client is capable 
of making informed decisions, and "that there is little risk of material 
prejudice to the interests of any of the clients" if the mUltiple 
representation fails.44 Third, the attorney must "reasonably believe[] 
that the common representation can be undertaken impartially and 
without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to 
any of the clients. "4S 
Unlike Rule 1.7, once the intermediation has commenced, Rule 
2.2 explicitly requires that the attorney "consult with each client" 
about decisions to be made and disclose to each client any relevant 
considerations that would aid each client in making an informed 
decision.46 Rule 2.2 also requires an attorney, during the intermedi-
ation process, to continually evaluate whether the conditions imposed 
37. [d. Rule 1.7(b)(1). 
38. [d. Rule 1. 7 (b)(2). 
39. [d. 
40. [d. Rule 1.7 cmt. 
41. See id. Rule 2.2. The text of Rule 2.2 is set forth in supra note 26. 
42. See id. Rule 1.7 cmt. Rule 1.7 applies to "common representation of persons 
having similar interests" when the risk of causing an adverse effect on the 
parties is minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are satisfied. [d. 
43. [d. Rule 2.2(a)(I). 
44. [d. Rule 2.2(a)(2). 
45. [d. Rule 2.2(a)(3). 
46. [d. Rule 2.2(b). 
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by Rule 2.2(a) still exist. 47 If anyone of the conditions ceases to 
exist, the attorney is obligated to withdraw. 48 Withdrawal is also 
mandated "if any of the clients so requests. "49 Rule 2.2 further 
imposes an additional restriction upon a withdrawing attorney; he 
"shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that 
was the subject of the intermediation."50 
In contrast to Rule 1.7, Rule 2.2 presumes that an acute or 
apparent conflict already exists.51 Situations where Rule 2.2 demands 
adherence include the representation of two or more existing clients 
in the same transaction52 and where three individuals are seeking to 
form a partnership.53 Choosing to follow either Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2 
in a nonlitigation setting depends on the "proximity and degree" of 
potential conflicts.54 "Relevant factors in determining whether there 
is potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of 
the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the 
functions being performed by the lawyer," the foreseeability of 
potential conflicts exacerbating into real ones, and the likelihood of 
prejudice to a client if an irreconcilable conflict does arise. 55 
B. Maryland Appellate Decisions 
While an attorney must consult Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2 before 
undertaking multiple representation in Maryland, the inquiry should 
not stop with the Model Rules. Another important source governing 
multiple representation in Maryland comes from Maryland's appellate 
decisions. Although these appellate decisions consider the relationship 
between mUltiple representation and Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and 5-
105 of the Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility (Maryland 
Code), they are instructive for several reasons. First, these appellate 
47. See id. Rule 2.2(c). 
48. [d. 
49. [d. 
50. [d. (emphasis added). 
51. "The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by developing the 
parties' mutual interests." [d. Rule 2.2 cmt. 
52. See id. The comment to Rule 2.2 states that a 
[d. 
lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a rela-
tionship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous 
basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or 
more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganiza-
tion of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest, 
arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or medi-
ating a dispute between clients. 
53. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:402. 
54. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1983). 
55. [d. 
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decisions highlight the pitfalls inherent in multiple representation. 
Second, they identify the particular multiple representation situations 
where an attorney has run afoul of the disciplinary rules, and suggest 
how the situation might have been rectified by the attorney. Finally, 
because these decisions interpret Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and 5-105, 
the predecessors to Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2,56 they provide a frame-
work within which to interpret the mandates of Rules 1.7 and 2.2. 
1. Multiple Representation of Joint Ventures/Formation of 
Business Entities 
Both the Maryland court of appeals and the court of special 
appeals have discussed the obligations of attorneys representing mul-
tiple parties in a joint venture. In Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. 
Comstock,57 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered 
the propriety of Kaplan's multiple representation of both Crest 
Investment and Mr. and Mrs. Comstock in an investment transaction 
involving the development of an animal breeding business. 58 Kaplan 
drafted a lending agreement conveying the Comstocks' farmland to 
a new corporation, Comstock, Inc., with Crest Investment assuming 
the Comstocks' outstanding,mortgage debt.59 At this juncture, Kaplan 
acknowledged that he represented the Comstocks and convinced Mr. 
Comstock that hiring a separate attorney to review the agreement 
was unnecessary.60 In the years following this initial agreement, the 
joint venture continued to fail, prompting Kaplan to draft two 
. subsequent agreements, each diminishing the Comstocks' interest in 
their property and primary residence.61 When foreclosure proceedings 
were initiated against the Comstocks, they sought independent counsel 
and sued Kaplan for malpractice.62 
56. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29. 
57. 23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974). 0 
58. [d. at 282-83, 327 A.2d at 894-95. 
59. [d. at 286, 327 A.2d at 896. 
60. [d. at 283-84, 327 A.2d at 895. 
61. [d. at 287-90, 327 A.2d at 8%-98. At issue was the November 30, 1967 
agreement that was the first of the two subsequent agreements drafted by 
Kaplan. [d. at 287, 327 A.2d at 896. The November 30, 1967 agreement stated 
that the farmland previously conveyed to Comstock, Inc. would "remain [its] 
absolute and sole property," with the single exception that upon repayment of 
the mortgage debt and repayment to Crest of all monies advanced to Comstock, 
Inc., the dwelling and one acre would be reconveyed to the Comstocks for the 
price of $1.00. [d. at 288,327 A.2d at 897. The November 30, 1967 agreement 
was significantly different from the initial agreement drafted by Kaplan because 
it extinguished Comstock, Inc.'s obligation, upon the satisfaction of all cor-
porate and mortgage debt, to convey the balance of 97 acres to the Com stocks 
for $1.00 or purchase it from the Comstocks for $5.00. [d. 
62. [d. at 291, 327 A.2d at 899. 
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The trial court found that (1) an attorney-client relationship had 
existed between Kaplan and the Comstocks, and (2) Kaplan had acted 
unfairly and had failed to make adequate disclosures.63 In considering 
whether the trial court had erred, the court of special appeals initially 
noted that "[t]he instant case ... presents a situation substantially 
different from a single transaction for the sale of realty."64 Rather, 
"the conveyance of the land and improvements was a part of a 
business promotion and all parties were ultimately interested in the 
success of the enterprise. "65 According to the court, although a 
conflict is not necessarily inherent in a joint venture situation, if the 
" 'clients' involved can foreseeably have adverse economic interests 
and if duality of representation is undertaken, it should be 'within 
very narrow limits.' "66 
After distinguishing the Comstocks' case from the typical real 
estate transaction, the court outlined the legal principles governing 
mUltiple representation in Maryland. The court stated that if multiple 
representation occurs, adherence to the Maryland Code67 and "pru-
dent concern for legitimate self-interest against possible liability dic-
tate that full disclosure be made of the possible dangers involved 
and that the legal representation be fundamentally fair to both 
sides."68 In describing what is encompassed by full disclosure, the 
Comstock court adopted the requirements of the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey verbatim from its decision in In re Kamp.69 
63. Id. at 293, 327 A.2d at 900. The trial court's decree stated the following: 
It is patently clear that the defendant Kaplan, acting as attorney for 
the [Comstocks] in this transaction, failed to make an adequate 
disclosure to them of all relevant factors involved in their entering 
into the agreement of November 30, 1967, with defendant Crest ... 
and said agreement was obviously preferential to his clients, defendants 
Crest and Comstock, Inc., and manifestly unfair to his clients, the 
[Com stocks] .... Any lawyer should have known that this was not 
a fair transaction and the failure to protect the plaintiffs and so advise 
them while acting as their attorney is a complete breach of the fiduciary 
relationship. 
Id. at 298, 327 A.2d at 903 (emphasis added). 
64. Id. at 302, 327 A.2d at 905. 
65.ld. 
66. Id. at 303, 327 A.2d at 905. 
67. The specific Disciplinary Rule under consideration was DR 5-105. Id. at 301, 
327 A.2d at 904. See supra note 24 for the text of DR 5-105 of the Model 
Code. Because Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and 5-105 of the Maryland Code of 
Professional Responsibility substantively mirror Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and 
5-105 of the Model Code, this Comment only references the text of the Model 
Code. Compare MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY DR 5-101 
& DR 5-105 (1981) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY DR 
5-101 & DR 5-105 (1980). 
68. Crest, 23 Md. App. at 303, 327 A.2d at 905. 
69. 194 A.2d 236 (N.J. 1963). The following is a recitation of facts from In re 
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Full disclosure requires the attorney not only to inform the 
prospective client of the attorney's relationship to the seller, 
but also to explain in detail the pitfalls that may arise in 
the course of the transaction which would make it desirable 
that the buyer have independent counsel. The full signifi-
cance of the representation of conflicting interests should 
be disclosed to the client so that he may make an intelligent 
decision before giving his consent. If the attorney cannot 
properly represent the buyer in all aspects of the transaction 
because of his relationship to the seller, full disclosure 
requires that he inform the buyer of the limited scope of 
his intended representation of the buyer's interests and point 
out the advantages of the buyer's retaining independent 
counse1.70 
Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to void 
the various transactions between the Comstocks and Crest Invest-
ment. 71 Although the court of special appeals refused to hold that 
Kamp: Iri 1962 Mrs. Cronk and Staben Custom Built Homes, Inc. (Staben), 
entered into a contract, whereby Mrs. Cronk agreed to purchase a home that 
was to be built by Staben. Id. at 238. The contract required Mrs. Cronk to 
make a $2,000 down payment at the execution of the contract, and then make 
periodic payments that coincided with the construction progress of the house. 
Id. In addition, the contract stated that all parties agreed that attorney Daniel 
Kamp would handle the closing of title. Id. Kamp first received notice of the 
sale to Mrs. Cronk when Stab en sent him a copy of the executed contract. Id. 
After paying Staben approximately $10,500, Mrs. Cronk hired her own 
attorney, Richard Huckin. Id. Huckin tried to conduct a title search of the 
property but was unable to locate the property with sufficient accuracy. Id. 
Huckin then contacted Kamp about his unsuccessful title search. Id. Kamp 
responded to Huckin's inquiry by telling him that Mrs. Cronk had signed the 
contract agreeing to Kamp's representation, and that Kamp had every intention 
of making Mrs. Cronk pay his fee. Id. Huckin then informed Kamp that "he 
considered such arrangement improper and would report his actions to the 
ethics committee if he continued to maintain his present position." Id. A 
complaint against Kamp was filed·with the Bergen County Ethics and Grievance 
Committee. Id. 
At trial, Kamp testified that he believed that the contract between Mrs. Cronk 
and Staben created an attorney-client relationship between himself and Mrs. 
Cronk. Id. Kamp admitted, however, that he never met with Mrs. Cronk, nor 
did he do anything to protect her interests. Id. The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey concluded that the facts "clearly show[ed) a violation" of the disciplinary 
rules. Id. at 239. According to the supreme court, because "[a) conflict of 
interest is inherent in the relationship of buyer and seller," representation is 
improper unless the attorney makes a full disclosure and receives client consent. 
Id. at 240. The supreme court unanimously reprimanded Kamp. Id. at 242-43. 
70. Crest, 23 Md. App. at 303, 327 A.2d at 905 (quoting In re Kamp, 194 A.2d 
236, 240 (N.J. 1963». 
71. Id. at 307, 327 A.2d at 907. The court stated that 
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multiple representation in a business transaction is a per se violation 
of the Maryland Code, it did conclude the following: "This is rather 
a situation where an attorney has chosen to act for both sides (with 
the knowledge of both sides) in a business transaction-an undertak-
ing which is indeed fraught with serious problems and potentially 
dire consequences and should generally be avoided."12 
Similarly, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert,13 the court of 
appeals subscribed to the court of special appeals' reasoning in Crest 
regarding mUltiple representation under the Maryland Code.14 Spe-
cifically, the court of appeals agreed with the court of special appeals 
that when multiple representation does occur, full disclosure, as 
defined in Crest, must be made regarding the possible dangers 
involved, and the representation itself must "be fundamentally fair 
to both sides. "15 Recent decisions in Maryland affirm the Crest and 
Atlantic Richfield requirement of full disclosure by attorneys under-
taking mUltiple representation.16 
In making a full disclosure to his clients, the attorney should 
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the common represen-
tation. When explaining the advantages, the attorney should inform 
all parties that they have both time and money to save; in addition, 
multiple representation may also have the effect of neutralizing 
conflicts that might be exacerbated if two more attorneys were added 
Id. 
Mr. and Mrs. Comstock were entitled to more, at the hands of Mr. 
Kaplan, than the advice that foreclosure was inevitable and, in effect, 
that their capitulation to the terms of the November 30, 1967 agree-
ment was their only alternative to financial ruin. Indeed, it is clear 
beyond any reasonable doubt that Mr. Kaplan at that point should 
have urged that the Com stocks engage independent counsel. His failure 
to do so and his failure to make adequate disclosure compel a 
declaration that the November, 1967 agreement was void. 
72. Id. at 300, 327 A.2d at 904. 
73. 295 Md. 347, 456 A.2d 20 (1983). 
74. Id. at 355-56, 456 A.2d at 24-25. Disciplinary Rules 5-101(A) and 5-105(A)-
(C) were under consideration in Atlantic Richfield. Id. at 356, 456 A.2d at 25; 
see supra note 24 for the text of these disciplinary rules. 
75. Id. at 356, 456 A.2d at 24. The court of appeals, quoting the court of special 
appeals, also adopted the language from In re Kamp verbatim. Id. at 356, 456 
A.2d at 24-25. 
76. See Walton v. Davy, 86 Md. App. 275, 286-88, 586 A.2d 760, 765-67, cert. 
denied, 323 Md. 309, 593 A.2d 669 (1991) (discussing, in the estate context, 
that a transaction will not be set aside if after full disclosure a client has 
voluntarily and knowingly consented to the multiple representation); Blum v. 
Blum, 59 Md. App. 584, 599-601, 477 A.2d 289, 296-97 (1984) (stating that 
although multiple representation is inappropriate in the domestic relations 
context, if undertaken, an attorney must nevertheless "disclose to the parties 
the possible ramifications of his [multiple] representation and their respective 
rights"). 
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to the equation. On the other hand, the attorney should also explain 
that if the multiple representation fails, each person will need to hire 
a separate attorney, resulting in increased costs and loss of valuable 
time. 
In addition, the attorney should explain to all parties that client 
confidences normally protected under Rule 1.6 must be shared among 
all clients. 77 Therefore, all clients are forbidden from "keeping se-
crets. " The attorney should stress that when one of the clients fails 
to disclose all pertinent information, it directly affects everyone else's 
ability to make informed decisions.78 The attorney should emphasize 
that when decisions are made, all parties should be present. In the 
event that the former is not possible, the persons not present at a 
meeting will be kept up to date by the attorney. The attorney should 
explain that if anyone of the parties attempt an ex parte conversation, 
he must be aware that this information will be disclosed to the 
remaining parties. In the event that anyone of them refuses to share 
all information, then they must be aware that the attorney will 
terminate the representation and discontinue any involvement in the 
transaction. 
2. Multiple Representation in Real Estate Transactions 
Although no Maryland case appears to have considered the 
propriety of multiple representation where the attorney has repre-
sented both clients in the past, several Maryland cases have addressed 
various aspects of multiple representation in real estate transactions. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the conflict of interest 
inherent in the lender/mortgagee-borrower/mortgagor relationship in 
Flaherty v. Weinberg. 79 The court of appeals offered the following 
77. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:202. After discussing confiden-
tiality, Hazard and Hodes make the following comment: "Perhaps more 
important, the evidentiary attorney-client privilege does not apply to parties 
who have shared a lawyer, so that if the parties were later to litigate against 
each other over the subject of the failed mediation, the lawyer would be called 
and forced to testify as a witness." [d. 
78. Martin, supra note 4, at 20. 
79. 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618 (1985). In 1977, Mr. and Mrs. Flaherty entered 
into a contract of sale to purchase a home in Frederick. [d. at 132, 492 A.2d 
at 626. The Flahertys financed their purchase by securing a mortgage loan 
through First Federal Savings and Loan Association (First Federal). [d. During 
the settlement, First Federal was represented by the law firm Weinberg, Michel 
and Sterns (Weinberg); the Flahertys, on the other hand, did not retain a 
separate attorney. [d. However, Weinberg assured the Flahertys that they were 
purchasing the property described in the contract of sale, and that this property 
contained a house and a well. [d. The Flahertys did not pay Weinberg any 
fees, in fact, Weinberg paid for the 1976 survey of the property. [d. at 132, 
492 A.2d at 626. 
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observations. One area where potential conflicts exist involves the 
respective title requirements of the mortgagor and the mortgagee.80 
The mortgagee desires that the title not be impaired to the extent 
that indebtedness exceeds the value of the security in the property. 81 
In contrast, "the mortgagor wants assurances of maximum enjoyment 
of the property and freedom from post-settlement claims by third 
parties. "82 Despite this apparent conflict, the court failed to address 
whether an attorney, giving the appropriate disclosures in accordance 
with the Maryland Code, could overcome this type of conflict, 
because it found that the facts did not give rise to an inference that 
a conflict existed between the Flahertys and First Federal's multiple 
use of the same attorney. 83 
The court of appeals also has considered multiple representation 
of sellers, purchasers, and mortgagees in the context of a disciplinary 
proceeding against an attorney. In Attorney Grievance Commission 
v. Lockhart,84 Lockhart, the attorney, was charged with violating 
several Disciplinary Rules under the Maryland Code, including Dis-
ciplinary Rules 5-105(B) and 5-105(C).8~ Lockhart had represented 
the sellers, Crystal Beach Manor, Inc., and its parent corporation, 
Extens Associates, various purchasers, and the mortgagees.86 As 
settlements on the various properties occurred, Lockhart failed to 
procure releases of existing liens on the properties; therefore, the 
subsequent title insurance purchased by the buyers and the mortgagees 
did not reflect that the land conveyed was subject to these existing 
deeds of trust. 87 
The court of appeals accepted the trial court's conclusion that 
DR 5-105(B) and DR 5-105(C) were violated because Lockhart's 
loyalty was to Extens, and such loyalty "adversely affected the 
exercise of his independent professional judgment in [sic] behalf of 
. In 1982, after obtaining another survey of their property, the Flahertys 
discovered that their swimming pool, well, and driveway were situated upon 
their neighbor's property. [d. at 132-33, 492 A.2d at 626. As a result, the 
F1ahertys sued Weinberg and the 1976 surveyor for negligence and breach of 
warranty. [d. at 133, 492 A.2d at 626. With respect to the negligence claim 
asserted against Weinberg, the court of appeals held that the trial court had 
erred in sustaining Weinberg's demurrer because the facts alleged that the 
Flahertys were the intended beneficiaries of Weinberg'S representation of First 
Federal. [d. at 138-39, 492 A.2d at 629-30. 




84. 285 Md. 586, 403 A.2d 1241 (1979). 
85. ld. at 587, 403 A.2d at 1241. For the text of DR 5-105(B)-(C), see supra note 
24. 
86. [d. at 590, 403 A.2d at 1243. 
87. [d. 
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the purchasers. "88 The court set forth the portion of the trial judge's 
opinion discussing the conflict of interest inherent in multiple rep-
resentation in real estate transactions.89 Specifically, quoting the trial 
judge's opinion, the court expressed the following opinion: " 'Clearly 
it would be improper ... for an attorney to represent both the 
purchaser and the seller, or the purchaser and the lender, without 
full disclosure of the facts and consent by all parties.' "90 
Although in this case the court suspended Lockhart for one 
year,91 it did express a tolerance for multiple representation in real 
estate contexts.92 The court stated: 
88. Id. at 591-92, 403 A.2d at 1244. 
89. Id. at 595 n.6, 403 A.2d at 1245 n.6. In his OpinIOn, Judge Rasin took 
" 'judicial notice of the practice in the Second Judicial Circuit [of Maryland] 
that it is not unusual for the same attorney to represent the seller, purchaser, 
and mortgagee in a real estate transaction context.' " Id. The Lockhart court 
then quoted liberally from Annotation, Attorney and Client: Conflict oj Interest 
in Real-Estate Closing Situations, 68 A.L.R.3D 967, 970 (1976): 
A problem for the attorney, and for representatives of the bar 
attempting to provide standards for guidance of the legal profession 
in this area, is that to require independent representation of all 
potentially conflicting interests 'would be impractical, requiring dupli-
cation of effort and greater expense on the part of individual clients, 
and a consequent increased cost to the public for legal services in 
real-estate transactions. On the other hand, to permit the representa-
tion of conflicting interests in the name of efficiency or economic 
necessity would interfere with the attorney-client relationship and with 
a client's right to expect an attorney to represent his interests to the 
fullest extent permitted by law. 
Lockhart, 285 Md. at 595 n.6, 403 A.2d at 1245 n.6. 
90. Id. (quoting ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal 
Op. C-472 (1961». 
91. Id. at 597, 403 A.2d at 1247. 
92. Other cases from the Court of Appeals of Maryland have expressed a similar 
view that mUltiple representation, with the appropriate disclosures and fairness 
to all parties involved, can be ethical in real estate transactions. See Attorney 
Grievance Comm'n v. Collins, 295 Md. 532, 553-56, 457 A.2d 1134, 1145-46 
(1983) (suspending Collins for one year for failing, while representing both the 
buyer and seller, to advise the former of his options and to include in the 
contract a noncompetition clause); Busey v. Perkins, 168 Md. 19, 176 A. 474 
(1935) (refusing to set aside the mortgage because the attorney had disclosed 
each party's respective rights and obligations). 
In a recent decision, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
Homa, the attorney who represented the seller, Friendly, Inc., and the buyer, 
P IT Ltd., Inc. in connection with the sale of mobile parks, was liable to the 
seller in fraud. Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, Inc., 93 Md. App. 337, 344, 
350, 612 A.2d 322, 325, 328 (1992), cert. granted, 329 Md. 168, 617 A.2d 
1085 (1993). According to the court of special appeals, when an attorney 
represents multiple parties in a real estate transaction, "if an attorney's 
relationship with the buyer interferes with his ability to represent the seller, 
the attorney must inform the seller." Id. at 347-48, 612 A.2d at 327. In this 
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Settlement lawyers in effect representing all interests, as did 
Lockhart, must recognize that they have a special duty to 
all parties to the settlement. This duty includes prompt 
obtention of appropriate releases of liens. It also includes 
prompt and proper disbursement of all funds passing through 
their hands. 93 
197 
A review of Maryland's relevant case law regarding multiple 
representation in business transactions indicates that the courts will 
permit multiple representation, provided that (1) the attorney makes 
a full disclosure to all clients, and (2) the representation is funda-
mentally fair. The type of full disclosure required by the Maryland 
courts mirrors the disclosure requirements codified in Model Rules 
1.7 and 2.2,94 and provides a noteworthy example of what full 
disclosure mandates. 
In contrast to the explicit provisions of Model Rules 1.7 and 
2.2, the Maryland courts will also judge whether the attorney's 
conduct . in the transaction, and any resulting agreements, were 
fundamentally fair to all parties involved. By stressing that the 
attorney is obligated to act fairly in relation to all parties, the 
Maryland courts seem to dispel any notion that mUltiple represen-
tation, in accordance with the disciplinary rules, can be equated with 
the attorney acting as a scrivener for the parties.9' On the contrary, 
by analyzing the agreement or transaction in terms of whether it 
was fair, the Maryland courts refuse to condone one-sided represen-
tation by the attorney. This refusal to recognize a one-sided agree-
ment or transaction would likely translate into a rejection by the 
Maryland courts of the defense that the attorney was merely "making 
legal" the parties' independent agreement. To permit an attorney to 
case, Homa's representation of the sellers was materially affected by his 
representation of the buyers because (1) he had a financial interest in PIT 
Ltd., and (2) he knew that the owner of PIT Ltd. would not assume Friendly's 
outstanding mortgage upon the consummation of the transaction. [d. at 350, 
612 A.2d at 328. Therefore, because Homa did not disclose either his financial 
ties with the buyer or his knowledge with respect to the assumption of the 
mortgages prior to undertaking the'representation, he breached his fiduciary 
duty to the sellers, [d. As a result, the court of special appeals upheld the trial 
court's finding that Homa's failure to make the appropriate disclosures made 
him liable to the sellers in fraud. [d. 
93. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 597, 403 A.2d 1241, 
1247 (1979). 
94. Compare supra notes 23·26 with notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
95. See, e.g., Blum v. Blum, S9 Md. App. 584, 601, 477 A.2d 289, 297 (1984) 
("Although counsel may have believed that he was merely acting as a 'scribe' 
with regard to the Blum's separation agreement, ... the very least counsel 
should have done was disclose to the parties the possible ramifications of his 
dual representation and their respective rights. "). 
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successfully raise this defense would result in an abrogation of the 
attorney's fiduciary obligation, which the Maryland courts have 
consistently recognized.96 
IV. OTHER STATE APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE 
REPRESENTATION 
A. Multiple Representation in Joint Ventures/Formation oj 
Business Entities 
Several states have addressed the propriety of multiple represen-
tation in the context of joint ventures and the formation of business 
entities. Oregon and Washington, for example, have considered 
whether multiple representation is appropriate in the context of joint 
ventures. In an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court 
of Oregon confronted the situation where one attorney represented 
multiple investors interested in purchasing corporate stock.97 Attempt-
ing to exonerate himself from disciplinary action, Moore argued that 
"he was representing the group purchasing Pinnacle Packing and not 
the individuals.' '98 
The court rejected Moore's defense because his testimony con-
flicted with his conduct in the situation.99 The court held that Moore 
had violated Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Model Code, by failing 
"to make full disclosure" and to receive the consent of all the parties 
involved in the transaction. loo However, the court did not rule out 
the possible validity of this defense should it be raised in a future 
case.101 
96. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert, 295 Md. 347, 353-55, 456 A.2d 20, 23-
24 (1983); Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, Inc., 93 Md. App. 337, 346-47, 
612 A.2d 322, 328-29 (1992), cert. granted, 329 Md. 168,617 A.2d 1085 (1993). 
97. In re Moore, 703 P.2d 961, 962 (Or. 1985). 
~8. Id. at 965. Apparently, Moore's defense was an application of the principle 
of "lawyer for the situation." See generally infra part V.A. (defining the 
"Lawyering for the Situation" model). 
99. Moore, 703 P.2d at 965. The Disciplinary Review Board stated "that what 
[Moore] apparently did in this case was 'follow the money.' " Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. In addressing Moore's defense that he was representing the group and not 
the individuals, the court stated the following: 
Id. 
Moore's letter of January II, 1980, claiming to represent only the 
group purchasing Pinnacle Packing came too late. The damage was 
already done. Which group was Moore representing-Vanya Corpo-
ration or JJ & L Properties? 
[Disciplinary Rule] 5-105(C) does not apply to this situation because 
Moore did not make a "full disclosure of the possible effect of such 
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment 
on behalf of each client." There was no consent by [the clients] to 
Moore's multiple representation. 
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The Supreme Court of Washington confronted an analogous 
situation in Eriks v. Denver.l02 The court dealt with the propriety of 
Denver's multiple representation of promoters and investors in a tax 
shelter arrangement. I03 The court held that Denver violated Discipli-
nary Rule 5-105 of the Model Code, by failing (1) to discuss any 
potential conflicts of interest with his investor clients and (2) "to 
explain any circumstances that might [have] cause[d] a client to doubt 
[his] 10yalty."I04 By failing to disclose the potential conflict that 
existed with his investor clients and to discuss the "dangers inherent 
in multiple representation," the court stated that Denver also violated 
his duty of loyalty to his investor clients. lOS 
Had Denver only represented the investors, he could have advised 
them that the IRS would audit each client's return and would 
probably disallow the tax credits and deductions associated with the 
tax scheme. 106 In addition, he could have informed his investor clients 
that if the IRS disallowed the tax credits, they could potentially 
assert claims against the promoters. I07 Instead, when the conflict 
actually developed, Denver advised his investor clients to seek inde-
pendent counsel. 108 According to the court, "the evil [that Disciplinary 
Rule 5-105 was] designed to prevent actually came about in this 
case." 109 
The Supreme Court of Arizona considered the propriety of one 
attorney representing a group of individuals seeking to form a 
102. 824 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1992). 
103. [d. at 1208-09. In 1977, the promoters started selling investments in master 
sound recordings as tax shelters. [d. at 1209. Because the promoters knew that 
the IRS would challenge the tax credits and deductions taken by the investors, 
they formed a trust fund to provide monies for a joint legal defense for the 
investors and promoters in future cases brought by the IRS against them. [d. 
The promoters then hired Denver to represent the investors and promoters who 
had contributed to the trust fund. [d. 
Before undertaking the multiple representation, Denver knew that the IRS 
was categorically denying tax credits and deductions based upon investments 
in master sound recordings. [d. Denver also was confident that the IRS would 
disallow the investors' credits and deductions. [d. In addition, Denver knew 
that the investors might have potential civil claims against the promoters. [d. 
Denver undertook the multiple representation after discussing his knowledge 
about the IRS's tax policies with his promoters, but not with the investors. 
[d. 
104. [d. at 1212. 
105. [d. at 1211-12. 
106. [d. at 1212. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. at 1211. 
109. [d. 
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business entity in In re Ireland. llo In Ireland, while representing a 
group of incorporators, Ireland also represented one of them in a 
pending domestic lawsuit, the outcome of which would affect the 
assets of the newly formed corporation. 11 I Not only did Ireland fail 
to disclose this domestic representation to the remaining incorpora-
tors, but he also failed to disclose this client's subsequent misuse of 
corporate funds. 1I2 Not surprisingly, the court held that the attorney 
had violated the Model Code by ignoring the full disclosure require-
ments. 113 By negative implication, the court would appear to permit 
multiple representation in this type of situation, provided that full 
disclosure had occurred. 
The common theme emerging from these three examples is that 
the representation of multiple parties in a joint venture or in the 
formation of a business entity can be ethically undertaken. In each 
of the preceding cases, the attorneys' conduct warranted sanctioning 
because of a failure to fully disclose possible conflicts. Had each 
attorney, in accordance with the Model Rules or the Model Code, 
explained to his respective clients the potential conflicts inherent in 
multiple representation and obtained their consent, he probably would 
not have been sanctioned. 
B. Multiple Representation oj Existing Clients 
A few jurisdictions have addressed the mUltiple representation 
of existing clients. In considering whether an undisclosed law firm 
may represent multiple claimants to a fund being distributed by a 
copyright tribunal, the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of 
Columbia Bar (D.C. Committee) permitted multiple representation 
within the strict confines of Rule 2.2.114 Although the law firm had 
formerly represented two parties before a copyright tribunal, the 
D.C. Committee advised that the law firm could represent these same 
two parties and a third party on the following conditions: 
1) [T]he firm fully discloses the risks and benefits of joint 
representation to all the clients, including a frank discussion 
of the implications of the rules on conflicts with former 
clients and confidentiality; 2) the firm obtains consent of 
each client to the representation; and 3) the firm does not 
110. 706 P.2d 352 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc). 
111. Id. at 356. 
112. Id. at 356-57. 
113. Id. at 358; see also In re Kali, 569 P.2d 227 (Ariz. 1977) (en banc) (suspending 
attorney for the failure to reveal his multiple representation to two clients for 
whom he had arranged a loan transaction). 
114. Legal Ethics Comm. of D.C. Bar, Formal Op. 217 (1991), summarized in THE 
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PRO-
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advocate for anyone of the clients in negotiations with the 
other clients as to the allocation of any award"l~ 
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Similarly, relying upon the mandates of Rule 2.2, the Connecticut 
Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics (Connecticut Com-
mittee) advised an undisclosed law firm that it could draft a sales 
contract between two existing clients. 1l6 The Connecticut Committee 
concluded that Rule 2.2117 governed the transaction because· 
(1) ... both the small business and the non-profit corpo-
ration had been represented over a period of time by the 
firm; (2) . . . both the small business and the non-profit 
corporation appear to want the law firm to perform certain 
services for their common interest; (3) . . . the parties will 
establish the price and other terms of the sale without the 
FESSIONAL CONDUCT 1 1001:2301 (1991) [hereinafter D.C. Bar, Formal Gp. 
217]. Ethics opinions are issued by the ABA and committees from each state's 
bar association at the request of an attorney faced with a particular ethical 
dilemma. See generally 1 to 4 NAT'L RPTR. ON LEGAL ETHICS (U. Publications 
of Am. 1993) (compiling various ethics opinions from each state). These ethics 
opinions are therefore only advisory in nature. Although the value of a 
particular ethics opinion will vary from state to state, ethics opinions generally 
serve to provide guidance to state courts when considering the propriety of an 
individual attorney's conduct, see, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 8, at 86, and are 
often cited as persuasive authority, see, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. 
Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 595 n.6, 403 A.2d 1241, 1245 n.6 (1979). 
115. D.C. Bar, Formal Op. 217, supra note 114, 1 1001:2301. 
116. Connecticut Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 91-14 
(1991), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA 
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 7 Current Rep., No. 23, at 385 
(Dec. 18, 1991). The Committee was presented with the following facts: 
[d. 
A law firm had for many years represented a small business and a 
non-profit corporation. One of the partners of the firm has recently 
been elected president of the non-profit corporation. The non-profit 
corporation has begun negotiations to acquire the small business. No 
one in the firm will participate in the negotiations to establish the 
terms and purchase price of any sale between the parties. The partner 
who is president of the corporation will abstain from participation in 
any discussion involving the transaction and from any vote taken. 
117. The Committee initially inquired whether Model Rule 1.7 or Model Rule 2.2 
applied to the situation. [d. The Committee concluded that Rule 1.7 did not 
apply and stated the following: 
[d. 
It does not appear that the representation of the small business by 
the law firm will be "directly adverse" to the representation of the 
non-profit corporation as required for the applicability of Rule 1.7. 
The deal will have been made and the firm will act only to prepare 
an agreement to incorporate the terms and to close the transaction. 
Therefore, the firm is not engaged by either party to take a position 
adverse to the other. 
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participation of anyone in the law firm; and (4) . . . the 
participation of the firm may be for the mutual benefit of 
both parties by expediting the transaction and saving legal 
expenses. liS 
According to the Connecticut Committee, it would permit the mul-
tiple representation on this limited basis if the law firm could satisfy 
each requirement of Rule 2.2.119 
The California District Court of Appeals also addressed the 
representation of existing clients in Blevin v. Mayfield. 120 In Blevin, 
Weis, the attorney, drafted a deed for two clients who had already 
agreed upon the essential terms of the conveyance. 121 Although the 
attorney had a prior attorney-client relationship with both clients, 
the court succinctly concluded that because the terms of the agreement 
had already been reached, "the only service performed by Mr. Weis 
was that of a scrivener."I22 Therefore, the court affirmed the trial 
court's holding that the evidence did not justify the cancellation of 
the deed.123 
These three preceding examples generally demonstrate that the 
mUltiple representation of existing clients can occur without the 
attorney violating the disciplinary rules. Several common features 
distinguish, however, the mUltiple representation of existing clients 
from the mUltiple representation of parties participating in a joint 
venture or forming a business entity. First, unlike the previously 
discussed cases on multiple representation of parties participating in 
a joint venture or forming a business entity, these three examples 
stress that multiple representation is appropriate where the parties 
have agreed in advance upon all the essential terms. Therefore, these 
118. Id. 
119. Id. For the requirements of Rule 2.2, see supra note 26. 
120. 11 Cal. Rptr. 882 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). 
121. Id. at 883. The case was brought as an action by the executor, Blevin, and 
executrix, Smith, to cancel a deed that the decedent, Howlett, executed in 
favor of Mayfield nine days before his death. Id. at 882-83. The plaintiffs 
sought to cancel the deed on the grounds of incapacity, fraud, and undue 
influence. Id. at 883. The decedent summoned Mayfield to his home, proposing 
that he sell her 80 acres of property for $5,000. Id. The decedent realized that 
the property had a greater value than his asking price. Id. Attorney Weis 
drafted the deed only after satisfying himself that the decedent was competent. 
Id. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred by refusing to 
set aside the deed drafted by Weis, because his prior relationship with both 
the decedent and Mayfield constituted an impermissible conflict of interest. Id. 
at 884. 
122. Id.; see also Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp., 586 P.2d 1378, 1384 (Idaho 
1978) (adopting the view that "if the parties have already agreed on the basic 
terms of the agreement and the attorney acts primarily as a 'scrivener' /Ie may 
normally represent both parties after obtaining their consent"). 
123. Blevin, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 882, 884. 
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examples seem to indicate that the attorney may not serve as an 
"advocate" for the parties, but rather may only serve as a "scriv-
ener" for the parties. 
Second, two of the three examples advocated a strict compliance 
with Rule 2.2 that, at a minimum, requires full disclosure, client 
consent, and attorney evaluation prior to and during the represen-
tation. In contrast to the varying application of Rules 1.7 and 2.2 
to the mUltiple representation of parties participating in a joint 
venture or forming a business entity, two of these three examples 
uniformly apply Rule 2.2. Therefore, according to these two exam-
ples, Rule 2.2, which governs intermediaries, should be followed 
when an attorney confronts the mUltiple representation of existing 
clients. Based upon these three examples, one can conclude that when 
undertaking the mUltiple representation of existing clients, an attorney 
(1) must be more careful to follow Rule 2.2 mandates and (2) should 
assume a less active role in the negotiations between' the parties. 
C. Multiple Representation in Real Estate Transactions 
1. Unique Approaches to Multiple Representation in Real Estate 
Transactions 
Many states permit the mUltiple representation of buyers and 
sellers, or buyers and lenders, or a combination of all three, provided 
that full disclosure and consent have been obtained pursuant to either 
the Model Code or Model Rules. l24 Of those states permitting multiple 
124. See Holley v. Jackson, 158 A.2d 803, 808 (Del. Ch. 1959) (holding that when 
an attorney acts for both parties in a real estate closing, he has a particular 
duty to disclose any potential conflicts and to ensure the protection of all 
parties); Florida Bar v. Teitelman, 261 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. 1972) (stating 
that where a seller is unrepresented at closing, an attorney for the buyer or 
lender may not charge the seller absent (1) the creation of an attorney-client 
relationship, (2) full disclosure, and (3) client consent to the representation and 
the amount of the fee); State v. Callahan, 652 P.2d 708, 709, 713 (Kan. 1982) 
(suspending attorney who represented a buyer and seller because he failed to 
disclose his business ties to the buyer according to DR 5-105); In re Dolan, 
384 A.2d 1076, 1080 (N.J. 1978) (requiring full disclosure before an attorney 
undertakes representation of both the buyer and the seller, or the financing 
party and the buyer); In re Kamp, 194 A.2d 236, 240-41 (N.J. 1963) (same); 
In re Conduct of Samuels & Weiner, 674 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Or. 1983) (stating 
that "[s)ince at least 1975, it has been clear that it is not proper for a lawyer 
to represent both the buyer and the seller in a real property transaction in the 
absence of express consent after full disclosure"); Dillard v. Broyles, 633 
S. W.2d 636, 642-43 (Tx. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that an attorney may represent 
both the buyer and the seller after he has disclosed potential conflicts and 
obtained the parties' consent), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); In re Nelson, 
332 N.W.2d 811, 812 (Wis. 1983) (suspending an attorney who represented the 
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representation in real estate transactions, some have imposed addi-
tional requirements beyond those listed in the Model Code or Model 
Rules, or have offered different rationales for the acceptance of 
mUltiple representation. Because these states have chosen a unique 
approach to multiple representation in real estate transactions, each 
approach is discussed separately. 
The West Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics (West 
Virginia Committee) addressed multiple representation in a host of 
residential real estate transactions because of a perceived "need 
among members of the state bar for a formal opinion. "125 In ad-
dressing the representation of buyers and lenders, the West Virginia 
Committee stated that "because of the nature of the real estate 
market in this state it is appropriate for a lawyer to represent both 
buyer and lender if certain conditions are met. "126 Before undertaking 
the representation, the attorney must first conclude that (1) "no 
actual conflict of interest" exists and (2) the parties can be compe-
tently served. 127 Second, the attorney must make a full disclosure in 
writing and receive written consent from the parties. l28 Third, in the 
event a dispute develops, the attorney is barred from representing 
either party in litigation. 129 
The West Virginia Committee next discussed the representation 
of buyers and sellers, acknowledging that this situation is "less likely" 
buyer and the seller in negotiations for the sale of a condominium, for his 
failure to disclose his financial ties to seller and seller's precarious financial 
position); see generally Jeb C. Sanford, Ethical, Statutory and Regulatory 
Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transactions, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 79, 88-
90 (1985) (discussing multiple representation of lender and borrower or buyer 
and seller in a single real estate transaction). 
125. West Virginia State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 89-1 (1989), 
summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' 
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6 Current Rep., No.6, at 117 (Apr. 25, 
1990). 




Because this is a small, somewhat rural state, real estate transactions 
between private individuals tend to be handled by one attorney. 
Frequently there is no clarification as to whom this attorney represents. 
Conflict questions cannot be resolved, however, without determining 
on whose behalf the lawyer is acting. 
128. Id. The Committee stated that "a lawyer may not be a party to a real estate 
transaction with a client without the written informed consent of the client." 
Id. 
129. Id. However, the Committee commented that an attorney may represent the 
buyer or lender, or both, in subsequent negotiations according to the require-
ments of Rule 2.2. Id. 
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to occur. 130 The West Virginia Committee remarked: "While there is 
no absolute ban on a lawyer's representation of both [the] buyer and 
seller, the lawyer must be very cautious in undertaking such a 
representation." 131 The attorney must provide the client with a written 
disclosure sheet explaining that the attorney-client privilege cannot 
exist.132 Similar to the representation of buyers and lenders, the 
attorney must withdraw if a conflict develops, and he cannot rep-
resent either the buyer or seller in subsequent litigation. 133 
Finally, the West Virginia Committee addressed "the unusual 
case" where the attorney is asked to represent the buyer, lender, and 
seller. 134 In addition to written disclosure, written consent or the 
clients, and compliance with Rule 2.2, the attorney must clarify "at 
the outset of the transaction whose interests he is representing." 13S 
By requiring written disclosure and consent in all multiple represen-
tation situations, the West Virginia Committee adds an additional 
requirement to Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2. In addition, the West 
Virginia Committee appears to accept multiple representation more 
readily because of the realities of the real estate market in West 
Virginia-a justification not previously offered as to why multiple 
representation should be sanctioned. 
Relying on Rule 1.7 instead of Rule 2.2, the Committee on 
Professional Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Association (Illinois 
Committee) advised that multiple representation is permissible in real 
estate transactions. 136 Under the Illinois Committee's interpretation 
of Rule 1.7, an attorney may draft documents for the lender and 
also represent the buyer, provided that the attorney "continuously 
monitor[s]" the representation. 137 "[I]f the lawyer believes that one 
representation is adversely affecting the other, he must withdraw 
from each representation." 138 
Significantly, the Illinois Committee recognized an additional 
limitation: If the attorney or his law firm serves as general counsel 







136. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 90-31 (1990). summarized in THE BUREAU 
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 1 1001:3004 (1991). 
137. [d. 
138. [d. The Committee stated that "[i]nitial disclosure must include the possible 
necessity of subsequent withdrawal." [d. In addition, the attorney may not 
represent either the buyer or the lender in a subsequent foreclosure or bank-
ruptcy proceeding in cases where the lender has a security interest. [d. 
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attorney nor the law firm may represent the buyer for several 
reasons.139 First. representation of the buyer "may be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to the lender." 140 Second. 
"even after full disclosure and client consent the lawyer cannot 
'reasonably believe' that the representation of the buyer will not be 
adversely affected. ttl41 Finally. the attorney "has a fiduciary duty to 
that institution and may have a possible personal interest therein. tt 142 
In a similar vein. the Massachusetts Bar Association Ethics 
Committee (Massachusetts Committee) recommended that the mul-
tiple representation of a borrower/buyer and mortgage lender in the 
same real estate purchase can be ethical. 143 Although the Massachu-
setts Committee noted that the interests of the parties are "likely to 
be diverse regarding the substantive contents of the mortgage docu-
ments." prior to undertaking joint representation. the lawyer should 
review all documents for any existing or possible conflicts.l44 Addi-
tionally. the lawyer should receive. preferably in writing. the informed 
consent of the borrower and mortgage lender .145 Finally. if a conflict 
or a dispute should occur. the attorney is bound to withdraw from 
representing either party. 146 . 
The Massachusetts Committee next advised attorneys about the 
relationship between confidentiality and multiple representation: 
Unless otherwise agreed. multiple representation waives 
the confidentiality obligation between the borrower and the 





143. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1990-3 (1990), summarized in 
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6 Current Rep., No. 13, at 259 (Aug. 1, 1990) 
[hereinafter Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1990-3J. The Com-
mittee analyzed this transaction according to DR 5-105(C). See supra note 24 
for the full text of DR 5-105(C). 
144. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1990-3, supra note 143, at 259. 
According to the Committee, when reviewing loan documents an attorney 
should be alerted to actual or potential conflicts if the documents contain 
"oppressive, ambiguous, or unusual provisions." [d. 
145. [d. The Committee stated that 
[d. 
146. [d. 
[tJhe lawyer should advise the borrower on the important terms of 
the mortgage and note, as well as on the contract that defines the 
lender's obligations to fund the mortgage loan, especially with respect 
to conditions imposed by the lender. A clearly written, unambiguous 
mortgage commitment that delineates the rights of the lender and 
borrower greatly reduces any risk of actual conflict. 
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acquires knowledge about either client relevant to the trans-
action, such as uncertain financial condition or source of 
funds, or misstatements, omissions, or errors in the mort-
gage application or the documents to be signed at closing, 
is required to disclose it to the other client. 147 
207 
In addition, the Massachusetts Committee suggested that potential 
conflicts could be prevented from occurring at the closing if the 
attorney included a provision in the purchase and sales agreement to 
the effect that the "seller will provide title acceptable to the buyer's 
mortgage lender or that any questions of title will be settled by 
reference to ascertainable standards." 148 
Like Massachusetts, the South Carolina Bar Association (Bar 
Association) advised that the mUltiple representation of lenders and 
borrowers in real estate transactions can occur without violating the 
disciplinary rules. The Bar Association offered a different rationale 
for its position, however. In its advisory opinion, the Bar Association 
was presented with the following factual scenario, which is similar 
to that presented in Act I, Scene 3: 
Law Firm frequently represents Lender in a wide range of 
matters. Law Firm also represents various Borrowers from 
time to time in real estate loan closings in which Lender is 
the lending party. In these transactions, Law Firm considers 
itself to be representing both Lender and Borrower; how-
ever, Law Firm considers its primary obligation to the 
Lender. 149 
Based upon these facts, the Bar Association concluded that "[a] 
conflict does not necessarily exist where one attorney represents the 
interests of more than one party in a loan closing. "ISO Rather than 
relying on Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2 for justification, the Bar Asso-
ciation turned instead to Model Rules 1.2(c) and 1.9(a).lsl Rule 1.2(c) 
provides that an attorney "may limit the objectives of the represen-
tation if the client consents after consultation. "152 In light of Rule. 
1.2, the Bar Association stated that 
[i]n order to preserve a continuing relationship with and 
loyalty to Lender, Law Firm prior to representing Borrower 
in a loan transaction may request that Borrower sign a 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. South Carolina Advisory Op. 93-23 in 4 NAT'L RPTR. ON LEGAL ETHICS SC: 
Opinions, at 105 (U. Publications of Am., 1993). 
150. [d. at 105. 
151. [d. at 105-06. 
152. [d. at 105. 
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document whereby Law Firm limits the objectives of its 
representation and Borrower consents to Law Firm repre-
senting the Lender in disputes which may arise between 
Borrower and Lender in the future involving the mortgage 
loan . . . . Upon completion of the closing such represen-
tation is deemed to be concluded. ls3 
The Bar Association then reviewed Rule 1.9(a), which provides 
that an attorney "who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related matter . . . unless the former client consents 
after consultation. "IS4 In light of Rule 1.9, the Bar Association 
commented that despite the waiver of the Borrower, situations in-
volving the continued representation of the Lender could arise which 
might be adverse to the interests of the Borrower .ISS In this event, 
an attorney would be required to obtain additional consent from the 
former client, the Borrower, or forego the continued representation 
of the Lender. IS6 
The New ¥ ork State Bar Association Ethics Committee (New 
York Committee) also considered the propriety of multiple represen-
tation of sellers and lenders in real estate transactions. The New 
York Committee concluded that an attorney should not represent 
both parties, except under unusual circumstances, and then only if 
the conditions of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) are satisfied.1S7 The New 
York Committee first recognized that multiple representation of a 
buyer and seller may ethically occur where "there is an agreement 
on price, time and manner of payment and other basic business 
terms."IS8 In the case of seller and lender, the attorney should be 
careful to determine "after weighing the specific facts and circum-
stances ... that it is not likely that the interest of these parties will 
differ," and should procure each client's consent after full disclosure 
of the implications. 1S9 The New York Committee explained the po-
tentially differing interests that can occur between sellers and lenders: 
If, for example, issues arise concerning the acceptability of 
title, or environmental conditions, or some other condition 
of closing, the seller may desire to close while the lender 
may decide it has no obligation to make the loan. In that 
event, the lawyer may be obligated to withdraw from rep-
153. [d. at 105-06. 
154. [d. at 106. 
155. [d. 
156. [d. 
157. New York State Bar Ass'o Op. 611 (1990) in 1990 WL 304218, at *1. 
158. [d. 
159. [d. at *2. 
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resenting either party, with possible delay and disruption to 
the pending transaction. 1OO 
209 
In direct conflict with the consensus existing among the various 
state courts and state bar associations that multiple representation 
may be ethically undertaken, one commentator urges attorneys to 
decline to undertake multiple representation in residential real estate 
settings. 161 According to this argument, "[t]he purchase of a home 
is one of the major rites of passage for a great majority of the 
American public." 162 Under this approach, the significance of pur-
chasing a home to the average buyer coupled with the inherent 
conflict of interest involved in either the buyer-seller or buyer-lender 
relationship mitigates against multiple representation. 163 Therefore, 
"a lawyer should avoid any attempt to represent more than one 
party in a residential real estate transaction. [E]ven the cautious 
lawyer may run into unexpected professional responsibility problems 
when attempting" multiple representation. l64 
2. Critique of Multiple Representation in Real Estate Transactions 
Advocating a blanket denial to undertake mUltiple representation 
in the residential real estate setting is problematic because such a 
denial understates the client's role by abrogating it completely. 165 
Urging attorneys to decline to undertake multiple representation 
indicates a lack of appreciation for the ability of clients to make 
informed choices once they are apprised of all material facts, and 
also fails to take into account practical realities. Particularly in the 
residential real estate context, the closing costs associated with se-
curing a first mortgage are substantial enough l66 to make hiring a 
160. Id. 
161. Philip W. Bolus, Comment, One for All is Worth Two in the Bush: Mixing 
Metaphors Creates Lawyer Conflict oj Interest Problems in Residential Real 
Estate Transactions, 56 U. CIN. L. REV; 639, 662 (1987). 
162. Id. at 639. According to the United States Government statistics, "the purchase 
of a residence is 'the single most significant financial step of a lifetime.'" Id. 
at 642 (quoting [Current) Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 69, 530, reprinted in 
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., SETTLEMENT COSTS AND 
You, A HUD GUIDE FOR HOME BUYERS (1977». 
163. Id. at 642-45. 
164. Id. at 662. 
165. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
166. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988), where Congress outlined the following reasons 
for its 1988 amendments to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974: 
The Congress finds that significant reforms in the real estate settlement 
process are needed to insure that consumers throughout the Nation 
are provided with greater and more timely information on the nature 
and costs of the settlement process and are protected from unneces-
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separate attorney financially impossible for the average home buyer. 
An approach urging attorneys to decline mUltiple representation, 
while easily followed, forecloses a realistic option for many middle 
income to low income clients-the choice to benefit from an attor-
ney's legal assistance. 167 Unfortunately, this approach runs the risk 
of leaving the clients without the assistance of counsel. If an attorney 
fully discloses any potential conflicts and reasonably believes the 
representation can be undertaken without adverse effect on the 
parties' interests, then the clients ought to make the final decision 
about whether to hire the attorney. As the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey has stated regarding the nature of full disclosure, "[i]t is 
utterly insufficient to simply advise a client that he, the attorney, 
foresees no conflict of interest and then to ask the client whether 
the latter will consent to the multiple representation. This is no more 
than an empty form of words. "168 Full disclosure enables a client to 
make an informed choice as to whether to hire an attorney. 
However, to suggest that the realities of the market dictate that 
multiple representation be tolerated, as West Virginia seems to do,l69 
does not necessarily compel a finding that mUltiple representation is 
per se ethicaL Multiple representation, regardless of the nature of 
the real estate market in a particular state, is only ethical if the 
attorney follows the mandates of the Model Rules by making the 
appropriate disclosures and receiving informed client consent. Before 
undertaking mUltiple representation in a real estate setting, the at-
torney ought to consider whether, under a givell situation, he is 
capable of addressing the issues, answering the concerns, and pro-
tecting each client. However, an attorney should not undertake 
multiple representation because he considers that the practical realities 
of the real estate market where he practices law justify such conduct. 
West Virginia advises that attorneys make a full disclosure in 
writing and also receive client consent in writing. 170 Similarly, Mas-
sachusetts suggests that client consent be made in writing. 171 Requiring 
an attorney to make written disclosures and to receive written client 
sarily high settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices that 
have developed in some areas of the country. 
Id.; see also Michael S. Glassman, Note, Real Estate Settlement and Procedures 
Act oj 1974 and Amendments oj 1975: The Congressional Response to High 
Settlement Costs, 45 U. eIN. L. REv. 448, 448 (1976) ("These [settlement] 
costs can be especially burdensome because they fall due at closing, cannot be 
prorated over the life of the mortgage, and in some instances are unreasona-
ble."). 
167. See Brown, supra note 6, at 51. 
168. In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1974). 
169. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
171. See supra text accompanying note 145. 
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consent is important and ought to be mandatory under the Model 
Rules. When an attorney accompanies his oral disclosure with a 
written disclosure sheet, the attorney enables the client to evaluate, 
at his own leisure, the risks and the advantages of the multiple 
representation. An attorney should also be obligated to obtain client 
consent in writing. First, requiring a client to consent in writing will 
not only put the client on notice of the dangers inherent in multiple 
representation, but will also make the client more likely to take his 
decision more seriously. Second, having the client sign a consent 
form also can protect the attorney from later claims by the client 
that he did not understand the ramifications of multiple representa-
tion, such as the waiver of confidentiality between the multiple 
parties. Therefore, written client consent and written disclosure serve 
as a safeguard for both the attorney and the client. 
South Carolina's approach in the real estate closing situation is 
particularly troublesome. 172 In essence, South Carolina allows a type 
of multiple representation that is inherently one-sided. According to 
the South Carolina Bar Association, with client consent, an attorney 
can represent the borrower and lender in a closing, and then represent 
the lender against the borrower should future litigation arise. Al-
though the South Carolina Bar has justified its position with reference 
to Model Rules 1.2 and 1.9, its reliance upon these two Rules is 
misplaced. For example, the comment to Rule 1.9 states that "when 
a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subse-
quent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests 
is clearly prohibited."173 Similarly, Rule 2.2 contemplates that after 
the representation in the matter is completed, the attorney shall not 
represent any of those parties "in the matter that was the subject of 
the intermediation. "174 
Even in light of the mandates of Rules 1.2 and 1.9, it is 
problematic to suggest that an attorney's loyalties in multiple repre-
sentation will not be divided when he is financially tied to only one 
of the clients. For example, what motivation does the attorney have 
to represent the best interests of the borrower, when the lender is 
paying his fee?17S South Carolina's approach seems to encourage 
multiple representation where the attorney's judgment is skewed at 
the outset. 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 149-56. 
173. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt. (1983). 
174. Id. Rule 2.2(c). 
175. See discussion infra part VI.F. For a discussion of the problems inherent in 
multiple representation where the attorney has had prior dealings with only 
one of the parties, see infra part VI.B. 
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V. LAWYER FOR THE SITUATION:176 AN ALTERNATIVE 
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION MODEL 
A. Defining the "Lawyering for the Situation" Model 
Although being a "lawyer for the situation" contemplates op-
eration similar to that imposed by Rule 2.2,177 it also adds some 
variations. Examples of matters requiring "situation treatment" in-
clude the following: (1) where two or more people, who have not 
been clients, bring a problem to a lawyer; (2) where a client becomes 
involved with a third party who does not have an attorney; and (3) 
where two or more existing clients bring a "situation" to the attor-
ney}78 Yet, " '[l]awyering for the situation' is marginally illicit pro-
fessional conduct because it violates the principle of unqualified 
loyalty to [one] client. "179 
Lawyering for the situation has been compared to the represen-
tation of an organization under Model Rule 1.13.180 "Just as formal 
entities cannot make their wishes known directly, neither can 'situa-
tions.' "181 The significance of characterizing the representation as a 
"situation" is that the attorney represents "no one," but acts in an 
effort to devise a common resolution of the problem. 
Although defining what constitutes lawyering for the situation 
is difficult because the concept is both flexible l82 and fact specific, a 
common thread pervades this theory: As the only attorney involved, 
he acts as a confidante, an analyst, an interpreter, and an instruc-
tor.l 83 The attorney must listen to each party's concerns, discover 
their needs, articulate incoherent or weak positions, outline the law, 
176. The term "lawyer for the situation" has been attributed to Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis. Frank, supra note 1I, at 683-86. In the midst of Senate confirmation 
hearings questioning his ethics, Justice Brandeis characterized his past repre-
sentation of several clients as counsel for the situation. [d. 
177. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:102-03. 
178. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETmcs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 63-64 (1978) 
[hereinafter HAZARD, ETHICS]. . 
179. [d. at 64. 
180. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, at 312. "A lawyer employed or·retained 
by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized 
constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983). 
181. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, at 312. 
182. "[U]nlike advocacy or legal counselling involving a single client, lawyering for 
a situation is not provided with a structure of goals and constraints from 
outside. The lawyer and the clients must create the structure for themselves, 
with the lawyer being an active participant." HAZARD, ETmcs, supra note 178, 
at 66. 
183. [d. at 64. 
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and devise a plan or agreement that reflects the common agreement. l84 
The attorney "could be said to be playing God. "18S 
The "lawyer for the situation," on the other hand, has 
choices to make that obviously can go against the interest 
of one client or another, as the latter perceives it. A lawyer 
who assumes to act as intercessor has to evoke complete 
confidence that he will act justly in the circumstances. This 
is to perform the role of the administered justice itself, but 
without the constraints inherent in the process . . . . A 
person may be entrusted with it only if he knows that in 
the event of miscarriage he will have no protection from 
the law. In this respect, acting as lawyer for the situation 
can be thought of as similar to a doctor's "authority" to 
terminate the life of a hopeless patient: It can be properly 
undertaken only if it will not be questioned afterwards. 186 
Although this approach could properly be "fit" into the frame-
work of the Model Rules, it allows the attorney to be more than 
just an intermediary or a passive advisor. This approach appears to 
encourage the attorney to serve as a third party participant. Law-
yering for the situation represents the "ideal forms of intercession 
suggested by the models of wise parent or village elder. "187 
B. Critique of the "Lawyering for the Situation" Model 
Although lawyering for the situation has its appeal as a departure 
from the traditional roles assumed by attorneys, this approach pres-
ents some potential problems. As Geoffrey Hazard, the promulgator 
of this approach, concedes, "[p]laying God is a tricky business. "188 
Not only must the clients place an incredible amount of trust in the 
attorney, but they also must defer to the attorney's "judgment." In 
addition to these concerns, a conscientious attorney will likely decline 
to assume such an omniscient role because of doubts regarding his 
or her own wisdom and sense of judgment. 
Some basic assumptions underlying this approach also are trou-
blesome. First, Hazard assumes that an attorney does indeed "know 
what is best" for a group of clients. 189 A lawyering model based 
·upon such an assumption seems prone to a paternalistic form of 
representation. Often clients with a prevailing common interest need 
184. [d. at 64-65. 
185. [d. at 65. 
186. [d. at 67. 
187. [d. at 65. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. at 64-65. 
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a referee rather than a "village elder." Unlike the clients, the attorney 
is often in a superior position, having the resources available to 
ensure a particular outcome. Although in an ideal world an attorney 
would not overreach, but would rather serve as consensus builder, 
in reality the opposite may be true. The more active the role that 
the attorney assumes, the more likely that an attorney will impose 
his or her judgment upon the decision of the group. As a master of 
both the law and the subtle art of persuasion, an attorney can 
influence the desired outcome. As a trained advocate, the attorney's 
active participatory role, as Hazard contemplates it, may forge a 
solution or an agreement never intended by the parties. 
Second, as Hazard admits, this flexible lawyering model has not 
been championed by members of the bar, and "[t]he fact that it has 
not been may itself be worth exploring. "190 Lawyering· for the situ-
ation has not been endorsed by bar associations, probably because 
it is a model that involves proceeding on an ad hoc basis. 191 To 
assume that attorneys want to engage in a mUltiple representation 
situation with few guidelines is problematic. First, attorneys are 
accustomed to applying rules. A large portion of law school and the 
practice of law consists of the application of "black -letter" law. 
Second, a sparsity of guidelines increases the likelihood that an 
attorney may run afoul of the ethical norms of the disciplinary 
rules-a proposition that promulgators of the disciplinary rules have 
probably recognized. 192 
Despite these legitimate concerns, lawyering for the situation 
embraces the spirit of what multiple representation ought to accom-
plish. In this model, "[w]hat the lawyer actually does is let the parties 
to the situation share his knowledge, skill and judgment. "193 Using 
one attorney "discourage[s] [the] escalation of conflict and recruit-
190. [d. at 65. 
191. See supra note 182. 
192. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983). The Preamble 
to the Model Rules states in pertinent part: 
[d. 
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are 
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict 
between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system, and 
to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while 
earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct 
prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of 
these Rules, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. 
Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive profes-
sional and moral judgment guided by the basic underlying principles 
of the Rules. 
193. ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 279, 281 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. 
Elliston eds., 1986). 
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ment of allies"l94 among the parties. Therefore, the parties 
benefit by saving time and money and by resolving the situation on 
an amicable basis. 
In addition to the benefit that can accrue to the individual 
clients, multiple representation also can produce positive side-effects 
in society. As one commentator describes, the attorney that categor-
ically declines multiple representation and encourages each client to 
retain separate attorneys disserves the public: 19s 
In the litigation process, a lawyer might be disciplined for 
representing conflicting interests. There is no comparable 
disciplinary proceeding that enables the profession to assert 
that a lawyer is overbearing or too demanding for requiring 
two lawyers where one might do. The public's remedy is to 
avoid lawyers entirely. That result should be regarded as a 
disservice to the public. l96 
Another positive side-effect that may accrue to society is the 
decrease in litigation. According to another commentator, "[t]he 
presence of multiple attorneys may also promote more litigiousness 
than there needs to be."I97 For instance, where three clients might 
be able to reach an agreement "in an informal setting, it may be 
that such agreement will be difficult where both sides are represented 
by attorneys before an actual conflict has arisen."198 Multiple rep-
resentation, therefore, appears to benefit both individual clients and 
society. 
VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN UNDERTAKING 
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION 
When undertaking multiple representation, an attorney should 
conduct himself in accordance with either Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2 
because, unlike the lawyering for the situation model, each Rule 
provides a concrete set of guidelines. At a minimum, each Rule 
obligates an attorney to consult with his clients about the implications 
of the multiple representation and the advantages and risks involved, 
and to obtain client consent. l99 In addition, both Rules ensure that 
the clients are apprised of material' facts before they agree to a 
multiple representation arrangement. 
194. HAZARD, ETHICS, supra note 178, at 64. 
195. See Brown, supra note 6, at 51. 
196. [d. 
197. See Kipnis, supra note 3, at 286. 
198. [d. 
199. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(b) & 2.2(a) (1983). 
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Whether the attorney should operate under Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2 
depends upon the facts of each case. In determining whether Rule 
1.7 or Rule 2.2 should be applied, the attorney should consider the 
following factors: (1) The relationship between the parties,2°O (2) the 
prior dealings between the parties,201 (3) whether the parties are 
existing clients ,202 (4) the degree to which the parties need to be 
apprised of the applicable law/03 (5) what role the attorney will serve 
in drafting agreements,204 and (6) the fee arrangement between the 
clients and the attorney. 20S By analyzing each factor, an attorney is 
better able to judge the scope of his potential representation and the 
degree to which conflicts, actual or potential, may affect the multiple 
representation. 
If the representation is more complicated at the outset, this 
would weigh in favor of the application of Rule 2.2, because this 
Rule requires fuller disclosure by the attorney than Rule 1.7.206 
Likewise, if the situation between the parties is more susceptible to 
conflicts, the application of Rule 2.2 is favored because it requires 
a more in depth evaluation by the attorney than Rule 1.7.207 Although 
an attorney may initially opt to follow Rule 1.7, the attorney's 
subsequent evaluation regarding the scope of his representation, or 
the nature of actual or potential conflicts between the parties, or 
both, might convince the attorney to follow Rule 2.2 instead. 
A. Relationship Between the Parties 
In deciding to undertake multiple representation, the attorney 
should first consider the relationship between the parties. By their 
very nature, some relationships are ridden with conflicts. For ex-
ample, conflicts are less likely to exist between two buyers as opposed 
to a buyer and a seller. To the extent the relationship is not prone 
to conflicts, the likelihood that a conflict will develop is naturally 
minimized. If the relationship appears amicable at the outset, the 
attorney probably only needs to follow Rule 1.7. If, however, the 
relationship becomes adverse, an attorney should engage in the more 
extensive evaluation process that is mandated by Rule 2.2.208 To the 
extent that any conflicts cannot be reconciled, the attorney may be 
200. See infra part VI.A. 
201. See infra part VI.B. 
202. See infra part VI.C. 
203. See infra part VI.D. 
204. See infra part VI.E. 
205. See infra part VI.F. 
206. See supra notes 26, 43-46 and accompanying text. 
207. See supra notes 26, 47-48 and accompanying text. 
208. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(a)-(b) (1983). 
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obligated by Rule 2.2 to withdraw from the representation.209 
Even where it may appear that the parties have an overriding 
common interest, the relationship may possess subtle conflicts. For 
example, "power dynamics" underlying the reiationship21O may pre-
vent the "matter [from being) resolved on terms compatible with the 
clients' best interests" or prevent each client from making informed 
decisions. 211 For example, "[a] contemplated 50-50 partnership may 
have deeply unsurfaced aspects because of age, wealth, know-how, 
and motivational differences between the two parties. "212 Rather than 
a neutral attorney, the dominated party needs an advocate.213 
Prior to undertaking representation of the parties seeking to set 
up a joint venture to sell industrial equipment, Attorney Jane from 
Act I, Scene 1 ought to be aware of warning signs that might indicate 
the existence of potential conflicts between Arnold, Betty, and Emily. 
Whether proceeding under Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2, Attorney Jane should 
consider the following questions: Is one of her clients more sophis-
ticated in business matters such that he or she may dominate the 
others?214 Are Arnold, Betty, and Emily already disagreeing about 
the amount of each partner's initial capital contribution, or that 
partnership voting rights should not be equal?2lS Have Arnold, Betty, 
and Emily failed to discuss some significant issues, such as the 
amount of financing required by the joint venture, or how to handle 
a withdrawing partner?216 Are Arnold, Betty, and Emily disturbed 
by the idea that they may keep no secrets and that all negotiations 
must occur jointly?217 To the extent that anyone of these questions 
is answered affirmatively, Attorney Jane should consider that multiple 
representation may be inappropriate. 
Assessing whether multiple representation should be undertaken 
also depends upon whether Attorney Jane "reasonably believes" that 
none of the parties will be adversely affected.218 To the degree that 
209. See id. Rule 2.2(c). 
210. The term "power dynamics" loosely refers to those factors underlying the 
parties' relationship that enables one party to dominate or control the judgment 
or decision making ability of the other party, such as age, wealth, social skills, 
emotional well-being, motivational differences, and/or business sophistication. 
See Brown, supra note 6, at 51; Robert G. Spector, The Do's and Dont's 
When One Lawyer Represents Both Parties, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1991, at 16, 
17. 
211. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(a)(2) (1983). 
212. Brown, supra note 6, at 51. 
213. Spector, supra note 210, at 17. 
214. See id. at 17. 
215. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 cmt. (1983). 
216. See Spector, supra note 210, at 17. 
217. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:202. 
218. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 & Rule 2.2 (1983). 
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the relationship between Arnold, Betty, and Emily is antagonistic or 
bound to lead to "contentious litigation or negotiations," Attorney 
Jane should decline representation.219 If, however, Attorney Jane 
believes in good faith that she can neutralize the effects of any power 
dynamics that may exist, multiple representation would be ethical, 
arid has often been successful where parties are seeking the formation 
of a business entity or the establishment of a joint venture to sell 
industrial equipment. Unlike the situation where parties are seeking 
to dissolve a partnership, if Attorney Jane's multiple representation 
fails, the end result is that the joint venture does not succeed. 
Attorney Jane will not confront the situation where Arnold, Betty, 
and Emily bring lawsuits against each other if the multiple represen-
tation fails. 
B. Prior Dealings with the Parties 
Another consideration in an attorney's decision to undertake 
multiple representation is whether he has had prior dealings with one 
of the parties. Commentators disagree over the course the attorney 
should take when confronted with this situation. To the extent that 
the attorney has represented one of the parties in the past, serving 
as an intermediary may be improper "when impartiality cannot· be 
maintained. "220 A salient example of when intermediation may be 
inappropriate exists when the attorney has represented one of the 
clients "for a long period and in a variety of matters," and has just 
been introduced to the new client.221 Other commentators believe that 
if the attorney has had either a close professional or personal 
relationship with any of the parties, multiple representation should 
not be undertaken: 222 "[A] lawyer can hardly be thought of as neutral 
when he or she has benefitted from one of the parties as a client or 
may do so in the future."223 As a practical matter, an attorney should 
probably recommend that the "new client or clients" seek independ-
ent counsel. 224 
An example of when multiple representation might be appropri-
ate is when the attorney is asked to establish an equal partnership.22s 
If the parties are "friendly and cooperative," have "similar business 
abilities and objectives," and are in a financial position to hire 
separate attorneys should the representation fail, multiple represen-
219. See id. Rule 2.2 cmt. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Spector, supra note 210, at 18. 
223. Id. 
224. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:204. 
225. Martin, supra note 4, at 20. 
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tation can be ethical. 226 The attorney should ask the parties with 
whom he has no prior dealings the following questions: What ad-
vantage do they see in using one attorney? Why are the clients 
unwilling to hire separate attorneys? Are each of the clients in a 
financial position to hire separate attorneys? In addition, the attorney 
should ask his current client the following questions: Who is respon-
sible for my fee? Are you aware that I may have to disclose to the 
remaining parties information that I have acquired through my 
representation of you in the past if it materially affects this trans-
action? Who suggested that I represent all of these parties? The 
answers to both sets of these questions will aid the attorney in 
determining if all parties are aware of the meaning of mUltiple 
representation, and their intentions in only using one attorney. To 
the extent that the attorney thinks that his client has improperly 
influenced the other parties' consent to multiple representation, the 
attorney should decline mUltiple representation. 
Discretion also weighs in favor of the attorney declining multiple 
representation when he serves as general counsel for one party.227 
Unlike the situation where an attorney owes allegiance to all clients 
equally, a situation where an attorney is financially tied to one client 
is fraught with difficulty. An attorney may find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to distance himself from his "employer." In addition, 
after the attorney discloses his financial relationship with his employer 
to the other party, the informed party is unlikely to allow that 
attorney to also represent him. Even if a party consents to mUltiple 
representation after full disclosure, an attorney should, nevertheless, 
seriously question whether his financial ties to the client will impair 
his independent judgment. 
Attorney Kate of Act I, Scene 3 faces a potential dilemma if 
she chooses to represent the lender, seller, and buyer in the residential 
real estate transaction described therein. Although Attorney Kate 
does not serve as general counsel to Lender Bank, she has been 
retained by Lender Bank in the past. Therefore, her financial ties to 
Lender Bank appear to be more complex than if she had only been 
hired for one transaction. Before considering whether to undertake 
the representation of Lender Bank, Sam Seller, and Bob Borrower, 
Attorney Kate must disclose her prior dealings with Lender Bank. 
By making the disclosure, Attorney Kate may be relieved of making 
a decision because neither Sam Seller nor Bob Borrower may be 
comfortable with her representation. In all likelihood, Sam Seller 
226. [d. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42 (The state of Illinois prohibits an 
attorney who serves as general counsel for a lending institution from repre-
senting the buyer in the same real estate transaction). 
220 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 23 
and Bob Borrower may only have a Hobbesian choice: either they 
jointly accept Attorney Kate's multiple representation or they forego 
representation altogether because of the expense. Therefore, when 
making her decision to undertake representation, Attorney Kate 
should weigh not only the strength of her loyalty to Lender Bank, 
but also how her refusal to undertake multiple representation will 
affect the transaction. If her refusal means that Sam Seller and Bob 
Borrower are unrepresented, then perhaps Attorney Kate ought to 
reevaluate her decision. 
If Attorney Kate ultimately decides to undertake the represen-
tation, despite her prior dealings with Lender Bank, she should satisfy 
the following conditions: (1) Attorney Kate must disclose the prior 
relationship; (2) she must be convinced that Sam Seller and Bob 
Borrower are comfortable with her divided loyalties; and (3) she 
must be confident that Sam Seller and Bob Borrower will not be 
apprehensive about "confiding in someone else's lawyer. "228 
C. Existing Clients 
Connecticut seems to have adopted the most sound approach to 
multiple representation of existing clients.229 By requiring the existing 
clients to agree upon all essential terms without the participation of 
an attorney, Connecticut helps ensure that the attorney remains 
neutral. 230 Without proscribing these additional limits, as Connecticut 
seems to have done, allowing mUltiple representation in accordance 
with either Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2 may cause the attorney unforeseen 
problems because all clients are not necessarily similarly situated. 
Attorney John of Act I, Scene 2 may experience loyalty problems 
if he chooses to represent his existing clients, Peter Purchaser and 
Sheila Seller, in connection with the purchase and sale of the seafood 
restaurant. Perhaps one of the two has generated a disproportionate 
share of Attorney John's fees over the years. Thus, Attorney John 
may unknowingly be predisposed toward one of the clients and thus 
sacrifice his impartiality. Unless Attorney John is assured that Peter 
Purchaser and Sheila Seller have in fact agreed upon the material 
terms of their transaction, he should not undertake the representation. 
In the event that Peter Purchaser and Sheila Seller have not ironed 
out the details to Attorney John's satisfaction, the best tactic may 
be to recommend that each client either seek separate counselor seek 
another attorney as an intermediary. 
D. Apprising the Parties oj the Applicable Law 
Assuming that Attorney John decides that the mUltiple represen-
tation of Peter Purchaser and Sheila Seller is appropriate because 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42. 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19. 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19. 
I 
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neither party has generated a significant amount of his legal fees so 
as to impinge his loyalty to either client, Attorney John must obtain 
each client's consent to the multiple representation. Before Peter 
Purchaser and Sheila Seller can consent and make informed decisions 
during the negotiation process, Attorney John must apprise both 
clients of the law governing the transaction. Although Peter Pur-
chaser and Sheila Seller are experienced business persons, they prob-
ably do not understand their rights and responsibilities under state 
or federal law.23I For example, Attorney John must advise Peter 
Purchaser about some of the warranties he may want to secure from 
Sheila Seller. Additionally, Peter Purchaser may not have asked 
Sheila Seller about inspections, parking permits, or the sale of a 
liquor license before he decided to purchase her seafood restaurant. 
Likewise, Sheila Seller may not expect the sale to be subject to Peter 
Purchaser's contingency requirements. 
In addition to advising each client about his or her respective 
rights and obligations, Attorney John should also explain what role 
the intermediary serves. Attorney John should inform Sheila Seller 
and Peter Purchaser that he will provide each client with the benefit 
of his skill and knowledge, but that he cannot advocate either client's 
position. Therefore, Peter Purchaser and Sheila Seller need to un-
derstand that Attorney John cannot "present the best position for 
either party. "232 
E. Drafting Agreements 
Before undertaking multiple representation, the attorney must 
consider that he cannot draft agreements that unnecessarily favor 
one party. For example, "[i]f the tentative figures do favor one party 
(because of mutual error, for example), [the lawyer] must feel entirely 
free to suggest amendments, without fear that the favored party will 
feel betrayed. "233 In addition to suggesting alternatives, the attorney 
also "must be careful to explain to each client alternative provisions 
that are to his advantage and disadvantage. "234 If the lawyer either 
reasonably believes that one party "would feel betrayed by having 
his or her advantage taken away," or later discovers this to be true, 
the attorney should decline or terminate the representatioll. 235 To 
adopt the view that the attorney serves only as the scrivener abrogates 
the attorney's fiduciary duty to act fairly and equitably toward each 
client; each client deserves to be informed about how each provision 
will impact his interest and the alternative provisions that might be 
included. 236 To suggest that the attorney is only a scrivener is to 
231. See Spector, supra note 210, at 17. 
232. [d. at 18. 
233. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:204. 
234. Martin, supra note 4, at 70. 
235. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:204. 
236. See Florida Bar v. Belleville, 591 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 1991). In Belleville, the 
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suggest that the attorney bears no responsibility for the final agree-
ment should it unnecessarily discriminate against one of the parties-
a proposition the Maryland courts have rejected. 237 An attorney 
should not serve as the rubber stamp for a transaction where only 
one client is making the decisions. 
Attorney Jane of Act I, Scene 1 should initially be concerned if 
Arnold, Betty, and Emily are asking her to be a scrivener in con-
nection with the formation of their partnership. If the parties do not 
want Attorney Jane's advice or suggestions about their agreement, 
then Attorney Jane should seriously consider declining multiple rep-
resentation. If, however, the parties are willing to listen to Attorney 
Jane's proposals and suggestions, then multiple representation is 
probably appropriate. Because the parties do not have a formal 
agreement in writing, Attorney Jane has considerable leeway in 
directing the negotiation process. Attorney Jane can supervise the 
discussions between Arnold, Betty, and Emily and ensure that all 
issues are addressed by the formal agreement. By directing the scope 
of the discussion, Attorney Jane can ensure that Arnold, Betty, and 
Emily understand their accompanying rights and responsibilities with 
respect to each .provision in their partnership agreement. 
F. Fee Arrangements 
Multiple representation may be unwarranted depending upon 
how the fee arrangements are structured. If an attorney learns at the 
Supreme Court of Florida confronted the situation where an attorney, Belleville, 
drafted the documents in a real estate transaction between the buyer and seller. 
[d. at 171. Although the buyer, Bloch, and the seller, Cowan, only negotiated 
for the sale of an apartment building, the documents stated that Cowan was 
selling both the apartment building and his residence. [d. In exchange, Cowan 
only received an unsecured note providing for 10070 interest to be amortized 
over a 25 year period. [d. 
In considering whether attorney Belleville committed ethical violations, the 
supreme court first noted that Belleville should have realized from the docu-
ments alone that the transaction was "one-sided." [d. at 172. According to 
the supreme court, Belleville should have explained (I) that he was representing 
an adverse interest, and (2) that the material terms in the documents that he 
drafted "so that the opposing party fully understands their actual effect." [d. 
The court stated: "When the transaction is as one-sided as that in the present 
case, counsel preparing the documents is under an ethical duty to make sure 
that an unrepresented party understands the possible detrimental effect of the 
transaction and the fact that the attorney's loyalty lies with the client alone." 
[d. The court then suspended Belleville from the practice of law for 30 days. 
[d. Based upon Belleville, if an attorney can be suspended for drafting 
documents that unnecessarily favor a party who is not his client, then an 
attorney should have a duty to draft documents that do not unnecessarily favor 
one group of clients. 
237. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
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outset that only one of the clients is responsible for the fee, the 
attorney ought to consider two potential problems. First, the financial 
resources of one party may be used against the other parties to coax 
arrangements that favor the "money-man." Second, the attorney's 
impartiality in the situation may be compromised. A natural response 
by an attorney is to extend more loyalty toward' the individual 
"paying the bill." To the extent that the attorney follows the fee, 
he or she may face disciplinary action. 238 Even the most impartial 
attorney may find that his equal allegiance toward all clients might 
wane over time. 
The fee arrangement proposed by Leon Loan Officer in Act I, 
Scene 3 does not appear to present a problem for Attorney Kate if 
she decides to undertake representation of the parties in their real 
estate transaction. In this scene, all three clients have agreed to be 
responsible for one-third of the fees. Attorney Kate might want to 
inquire where Bob Borrower is receiving the money for his one-third 
of the fee. For example, if Bob Borrower is receiving his "fee funds" 
from Lender Bank, he may be inclined to follow Lender Bank on 
all issues out of a desire to have his property financed. Although 
having Bob Borrower's fee financed may not necessarily affect At-
torney Kate's loyalty to Bob Borrower, she may find herself in a 
position where Lender Bank is dictating the terms of the agreement 
at the expense of Bob Borrower. Provided that Lender Bank does 
not dominate the discussions and coerce decisions, the equal division 
of the fee does not appear to present loyalty concerns for Attorney 
Kate. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
When an attorney is confronted with the opportunity for multiple 
representation in Maryland, the impulse to categorically decline the 
representation is no longer an appropriate response. While it remains 
true that the avoidance of multiple representation will spare the 
attorney from confronting ethical dilemmas, this stance indicates a 
lack of appreciation for the multi-faceted roles that attorneys now 
serve. Particularly when an attorney operates on a transactional level, 
multiple representation may become necessary to serve all of the· 
client's needs. When multiple representation succeeds', the attorney 
not only saves money for a group of clients, but can also often 
"sustain[] good relations between the parties that will pay dividends 
in the future. "239 If an attorney is honestly interested in assisting and 
advising clients, particularly those of modest means, and nurturing 
238. See, e.g., In re Moore, 703 P.2d 961, 965 (Or. 1985). 
239. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:202. 
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attorney-client relationships, mUltiple representation seemingly offers 
the attorney a viable alternative. 
The attorney's role in multiple representation is best understood 
as explaining the applicable law to the parties, sharpening the issues, 
and describing both the advantages and disadvantages of the potential 
alternatives. To characterize the attorney as a "scrivener" is to miss 
the point of multiple representation. The attorney has a fiduciary 
obligation to ensure that the negotiations and any subsequent agree-
ments are the product of clients who are making decisions on an 
informed basis and on an equal footing. 
The more often Maryland attorneys champion the role of inter-
mediary and serve both as counselors and advisors to multiple clients, 
the more likely it seems that lawyering will not necessarily be equated 
with the courtroom. A positive side-effect also will accrue to clients. 
Although the role that the litigation process serves should not be 
minimized where the courts are often the only proper or realistic 
arena for legal redress, the current state of litigation might be 
drastically different if clients were more inclined to seek one attorney 
to help maximize their common goals and iron out their insignificant 
differences of opinion. Perhaps clients would be less quick to re-
spond, "I'll see you in court," when the first impasse arises. 
Gretchen L. Jankowski 
